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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the harm that occurs to individuals whose data has been exposed to a 
third party as a result of a data breach, but which has not been used to commit identity 
theft or fraud.  
 
The vast majority of Americans disclose their Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) 
to private entities almost everyday. Yet this information is increasingly insecure in those 
hands, as a recent rise in data breaches makes evident. Law responded to this problem, in 
part, by criminalizing hacking and identity theft. But have individuals suffered harm 
when their data has been made vulnerable? Where the hacker has not used the PII to 
commit fraud, American courts have concluded that there is simply no harm for them to 
redress. 
 
This thesis examines the premise that individuals have not suffered harm unless they 
have sustained a concrete financial injury. Part I engages scholarly literature to explain 
the concept of autonomy. This Part develops how each of liberty, dignity and privacy 
protect the value of autonomy in American law. Part II then applies each of these 
concepts in the data breach context to show that the resulting harm is to an individuals’ 
autonomy. Unlike other instances in which autonomy is vulnerable, here neither privacy 
nor liberty can be convincingly used as a legal tool to protect it. Instead, the proper tool is 
the invocation of dignitary harms. Faced with an uncertainty about how their information 
may be used, victims lose awareness of their negative freedom. This harm deserves legal 
redress. 
 
Finally, Part III argues for the practical utility of the harm inquiry. Recently, the FTC has 
been challenged to identify what, if any, injuries befall consumers whose data has been 
made vulnerable where there has been no identity theft. This thesis urges the recognition 
of the harm as one to individuals’ dignity. Doing so refocuses the inquiry against the 
companies who hold PII, instead of the hacker who acquires it. Doing so also justifies 
FTC actions against such companies.   
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 What we have been examining is one facet of man’s struggle for a human 
dimension in a highly structured society, for dignity notwithstanding dependence.  




 Just before Christmas 2013, Mike and Hallie, a young married couple in 
Minneapolis, received an e-mail from Target. The e-mail explained that Target’s data 
security system had been breached by an unknown hacker, and that Target customers’ 
personal information was now outside of Target’s control. This meant Mike and Hallie’s 
credit card information was now vulnerable to use by the hacker. 
 “We understand that a situation like this creates stress and anxiety about the 
safety of your payment card data at Target,” the e-mail read.2 “Our brand has been built 
on a 50-year foundation of trust with our guests, and we want to assure you that the cause 
of this issue has been addressed and you can shop with confidence at Target.”3 Target 
offered a year of credit monitoring to bolster its claim.4   
 Despite Target’s assurances, Mike and Hallie felt anything but confidence or 
trust. “Something like a data breach feels so far removed from the actual consumer that 
when it happens, you’re left feeling a bit helpless,” Hallie explained.5 “[We] just have to 
                                                
1 Alan Westin, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM xi (Athenaeum, 1967).  
2 E-mail from Target Corporation (Dec. 21, 2013).  
3 Id.  
4 Id. (“[W]e will offer free credit monitoring services for everyone impacted. We’ll be in touch with you 
soon on how and where to access the service.”). 
5 Interview with Mike and Hallie (Feb. 9, 2015).  
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hope that the system Target put in place is good enough to stop the damage.”6 Unsure of 
what would happen with their information, the couple kept an eye on their bank 
statements, waiting to see if their identity would be used to rack up fraudulent charges.  
 Millions of Americans have been in Mike and Hallie’s position. Nearly all 
Americans operate in today’s so-called Information Age, in which personal information 
is “widely disseminated and easily available” through the use of computer technology.7  
Americans find it increasingly difficult to live in modern society without releasing their 
“personally identifiable information” (“PII”),8 such as name, Social Security number, 
address, and credit card information – information that is valuable insofar as it can be 
used to commit identity theft or other financial harms to individuals. Email, for instance, 
“plays an indispensable part in the Information Age” and has become “so pervasive that 
some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential means or necessary instrument[ ] for 
self-expression, even self-identification.”9 Yet one must disclose PII to open a “Gmail” 
                                                
6 Id.  
7 Information Age, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY. 2015, (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) 
http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/information%20age.  
8 “Personally identifiable information” lacks a uniform definition. See Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. 
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. 
L.Q. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). The Video Privacy Protection Act defines it as “information which identifies 
a person.” Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) defines it as “nonpublic personal information.” Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 
6809(4)(A) (2006). Other statutes take a more specific approach, defining specific information as PII. See, 
e.g., Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, 201 Mass. 
Code Regs. § 17.04 (2010) (defining PII as a person’s first name and last name, or first initial and last name 
in combination with either a Social Security number, driver’s license number, financial account number, or 
credit or debit card number).  
9 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010). Over 85% of Americans are online. See 
Kathryn Zickuhr, Who’s Not Online and Why, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sep. 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/25/whos-not-online-and-why/. 
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account.10 Or consider banking. More than 93 percent of Americans have a bank 
account,11 the use of which requires disclosing PII.12 And when it comes time to purchase 
goods, Americans inevitably fork over their PII.13 Thus, “life today is fueled by 
information, and it is virtually impossible to live as an Information Age ghost, leaving no 
trail or residue.”14 Indeed, the enormous amount of individuals affected by data breaches 
today is testament to the pervasiveness of PII collection. The Target breach alone, for 
example, affected up to 70 million Americans in addition to Mike and Hallie.15  
 Yet, while individuals must release their PII, it is increasingly insecure in the 
hands of the entities, like Target, storing it. Anyone who reads the newspaper knows all 
too well the ubiquity of data breaches. High-profile breaches, like Sony’s in late 2014, or 
breaches in which massive amounts of valuable and sensitive personal information are 
                                                
10 See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (updated Dec. 2014), http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (“[M]any of 
our services require you to sign up for a Google Account. When you do, we’ll ask for personal information, 
like your name, email address, telephone number or credit card.”). 
11 See 2013 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. (Oct. 2014), available at https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/. 
12 To open a Wells Fargo or Bank of America account, one must disclose their Social Security number and 
driver’s license information. What You’ll Need, WELLS FARGO (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); 
https://apply.wellsfargo.com/common_auth_start; Apply Online Frequently Asked Questions, Bank of 
America (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) 
http://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/checksave/index.cfm?template=lc_faq_applyonline&context=&st
atecheck=VA&cd_bag=&sa_bag=&ch_bag  
13 Brief for the Fed. Trade Comm. at 2, Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, LLC 
(FTC 2014), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141105wyndham_3cir_ftcbrief.pdf. (“Virtually all 
modern commerce involves the collection and storage of consumers’ personal data, such as credit card 
numbers, passwords, and social security numbers.”). 
14 Daniel Solove, THE DIGITAL PERSON: PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 8 (2004).  
15 According to Target’s estimate. See Data Breach FAQ, TARGET (Feb. 2015 10:11 AM), available at 
https://corporate.target.com/about/shopping-experience/payment-card-issue-FAQ#q5888. 
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exposed, like the January 2015 Anthem breach, regularly make headlines.16 But even 
smaller breaches are occurring with increasing regularity. The Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse began tracking data breaches – defined as “electronic entry by an outside 
party, malware and spyware” – large and small – in 2005.17 Since 2012, each year has 
seen a steady increase.18 Deemed “the year of the breach,” 2014 saw 904 million records 
exposed within the first 9 months – a 95% increase from the same period in 2013.19 And 
as of April 2015, 80,202,541 data breaches have already been recorded – up from 
67,009,098 in 2014.20 These breaches are, by and large, preventable. A number of studies 
have concluded that anywhere from 90 to 95% of breaches could have been prevented21 
                                                
16 See Andrea Peterson, Lawsuits Against Sony Pictures Could Test Employer Responsibility for Data 
Breaches, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/12/19/lawsuits-against-sony-pictures-could-test-employer-responsibility-for-data-
breaches/; Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, Data Breach at Anthem May Forecast a Trend, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/business/data-breach-at-anthem-may-lead-to-
others.html. 
17 See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005 – Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015). 
18 Id. See also 2014 Internet Security Threat Report, SYMANTEC CORPORATION, available at 
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/threatreport.jsp (finding over 552 million unique 
identities were exposed because of breaches occurring in 2013 and that there was an increase of 62 percent 
in 2013 over data breaches reported in 2012). 
19 2015 Data Protection & Breach Notification Readiness Guide, THE ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE 4 (Feb. 12, 
2015) available at https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/dpd_2015_guide.pdf. 
20 See supra note 17. 
21 See, e.g., supra note 19 (“While some may claim these breaches are the result of highly technical and 
sophisticated efforts, the data reported by the FBI and other organizations continually report more than 90 
percent were avoidable had widely accepted best practices and security controls been applied.”); John 
Fisher, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for the Negligent Enablement of Data Breach, 
4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 220 (2013) (discussing recent data breaches and noting that “such 
incidents could often have been ameliorated or even entirely avoided by employing a minimal amount of 
modern information security practices.”); Mary Culnan and Cynthia Williams, How Ethics Can Enhance 
Organizational Privacy: Lessons from the ChoicePoint and TJX Data Breaches, 33 MIS QUARTERLY 4, 
678 (2009) (“A recent analysis by Verizon Business of more than 500 forensic investigations of U.S. 
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by the PII recipients with simple mechanisms such as data encryption or the use of 
Secure Sockets Layer.22 
 These breaches cause concrete, financial harms to the individual. Identity theft 
and accompanying fraud constitute a growing type of criminal activity in which a cyber 
thief impersonates the victim to fraudulently spend the victim’s money.23 In the wake of 
an identity theft, victims spend precious time and money to get their financial house in 
order.24 No surprise, then, that law has responded to identity theft victims’ plight. 
Hacking is illegal,25 and Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence 
Act in 1998, which criminalizes the transfer or use of another’s identity to commit any 
other crime.26 And plaintiffs in all 50 states can bring claims under state law corollaries.27 
                                                                                                                                            
breaches involving more than 230 million records found that nearly 90 percent could have been prevented 
had reasonable security measures been implemented.”).  
22 Secured Sockets Layers (SSL) are the standard security technology for establishing an encrypted link 
between a web server and a browser, which ensures that all data passed between the web server and 
browsers “remain private and integral.” FAQ: What is SSL? SSL.COM (last accessed Mar. 8, 2015), 
http://info.ssl.com/article.aspx?id=10241. SSL “is an industry standard and is used by millions of websites 
in the protection of their online transactions with their customers.” Id. For a discussion of some of the 
“cyber hygiene” practices companies are failing to implement, see Danny Yadron, Five Simple Steps to 
Protect Corporate Data: What Companies Should Be Doing to Protect Their Computer Systems – But 
Aren’t, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/five-simple-steps-to-protect-corporate-
data-1429499477?mg=id-wsj. 
23 Daniel Solove, THE NEW VULNERABILITY: DATA SECURITY AND PERSONAL INFORMATION IN SECURING 
PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 112 (Radin & Chander, eds., Stanford University Press, 2008). 
24 Identify Theft Survey Report FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 6 (Sept. 2006) (“Victims of all types of ID 
theft spent hours of their time resolving the various problems that result from ID theft. The median value 
for the number of hours spent resolving problems by all victims was 4. However, 10 percent of all victims 
spent at least 55 hours resolving their problems. The top 5 percent of victims spent at least 130 hours.”). 
For a discussion of the emotional turmoil identity theft victims face, see Herb Weisbaum, ID Theft Can 
Take Heavy Emotional Toll on Victims, TODAY MONEY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.today.com/money/id-
theft-can-take-heavy-emotional-toll-victims-1D80305639. 
25 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §  1030. 
26 18 USCS § 1028. The statute makes it a crime to “knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a 
means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity 
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The government is eager to help the millions of identity theft victims reclaim their lost 
money and identity,28 and identity theft prosecution is, understandably, highly 
prioritized.29 
 But have been individuals been harmed even where their PII has not been used to 
commit fraud? Are customers like Mike and Hallie harmed when the entities that store 
their information – be it Target, their local bank, or some other entity30 – fail to protect it, 
such that the use of their information to commit fraud becomes merely more likely? By 
and large, American law has responded with an unsympathetic “no.” Where there has 
been a breach without identity theft, plaintiffs have largely been unable to obtain a 
remedy against the entities who store their PII for failing to protect it against a breach.31  
                                                                                                                                            
that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local 
law.” See Identity Theft Overview, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (last accessed Mar. 8, 2015), available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/identity_theft/identity-theft-overview. 
27 Identity Theft, NAT. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last accessed Mar. 8, 2015), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/identity-theft-state-statutes.aspx. (providing 
each State’s data breach laws); See also State Laws: Criminal, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/law-enforcement/state-laws-criminal.html (listing all states 
and federal territories that classify identity theft as criminal conduct). 
28 See, e.g., Guide for Assisting Identity Theft Victims, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 2013), 
available at http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0119-guide-assisting-id-theft-victims.pdf. 
29 See The Department of Justice’s Efforts to Combat Identity Theft, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION, at iii and iv (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/a1021.pdf (discussing “the DOJ’s improve[d] . . . efforts to combat 
identity theft” and noting that “the FBI frequently addresses identity theft through the Cyber Division’s 
criminal intrusion program, which is currently a top FBI priority.”). 
30 This thesis will refer to organizations that store individuals’ PII as simply “PII recipients” for shorthand. 
31 Fisher, supra note 17, at 217. As the Third Circuit recently explained: “In this increasingly digitized 
world, a number of courts have had occasion to decide whether the risk of future harm posed by data 
security breaches confers standing on persons whose information may have been accessed. Most courts 
have held that such plaintiffs lack standing because the harm is too speculative.” Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 
664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). 
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 Yet there is a growing sense that individuals are harmed even where their 
information has not been used to commit identity theft.32 Scholars have openly 
questioned the “no harm, no foul” premise that individuals are not harmed in the absence 
of some use of their PII, but recognize the “specifically acute problem” of identifying 
how that harm can best be described.33 Law Professors Daniel Solove and Woodrow 
Hartzog ask:  
What is the harm when data is leaked? This question has confounded 
courts, which often don’t recognize a harm . . . If people’s data are leaked, 
but they do not suffer from identity theft, are they harmed? Although 
courts struggle to recognize harm, there clearly seems to be a substantial 
negative impact on people’s lives.34 
 
 Solove and Hartzog take a literal approach to answering this question. They 
discuss the physical and financial toils victims must endure to rectify their financial state 
of affairs.35 This thesis, in contrast, seeks to answer that question by suggesting a broader 
conception of harm. What value or legal interest is invaded when the entities that collect 
our PII fail to protect it? What is the nature of this harm?  
                                                
32 These types of cases “are those in which the plaintiff’s information has been accessed but that 
information has not been used to open bank accounts, make unauthorized purchases, or otherwise harm the 
plaintiffs. However, these plaintiffs typically claims that they have been harmed in other ways: incurring 
costs for credit-monitoring services, paying the costs of cancelling and receiving new bank cards, suffering 
loss of reward points from cancelled cars, and enduring general anxiety that their information will be used 
in the future to make unauthorized purchases.” Caroline C. Cease, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the 
Current State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399 (2014).  
33 Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 33 (2015). 
34 Id.  
35 Id. (“The harm of credit card fraud is that it can take a long time to replace all the credit card information 
in various accounts. People have card data on file with countless businesses and organizations for 
automatic charges and other transactions. Replacing all this data can be a major chore. People’s time has a 
price. That price will vary, but it rarely is zero . . . A data breach also causes a harm because people are at 
greater risk for fraud and will feel anxiety and concern. People might reasonably spend money and time to 
protect themselves.”).  
  8 
 This thesis seeks to examine what harm occurs to individuals whose data has been 
made vulnerable (that is, out of the original receiving party’s control) in the wake of a 
data breach, but who have not yet been victims of identity theft.36 Two research questions 
guide the thesis:  
RQ1: What harm occurs to individuals whose data has been exposed due 
to a data breach, but who have not been victims of identify theft? What is 
the nature of that harm? 
 
RQ2: Is this harm the type law should address? 
 
 In addressing these questions, the thesis attempts to avoid a marked tendency to 
resort to so-called “intuitionist” arguments, in which harm is assumed as self-evident but 
not described.37 Instead, this thesis examines what harm, if any, occurs at each discrete 
sequence of events within the data breach context: (1) the transfer of PII from the 
individual to the PII recipient; (2) the storage and security of the PII; and (3) the breach 
itself.  
                                                
36 A variety of activities may give rise to data security breaches. “Breaches can result from intentional 
actions, including hacking; employee theft; theft of equipment (such as laptop computers and hard drives); 
and deception or misrepresentation to obtain unauthorized data. They can also arise from negligent conduct 
by the organization that suffered the security breach, including the loss of laptop computers or hard disks, 
loss of data tapes; unintentional exposure of data on the Internet; and improper disposal of data. Security 
breaches can also arise from an organization's implementation of software that the organization reasonably 
believes to be secure, but which contains vulnerabilities that render it insecure.” Michael D. Scott, The 
FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far? 
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 144-45 (2008). This thesis does not draw a distinction between breaches caused by 
hackers intending to penetrate a security system, and breaches in which some negligence on the part of the 
PII-recipient itself causes information to be released. From the individual’s perspective, both situations 
place the individual in a state of anxiety about how their information may be used, as discussed more in 
Part II, infra.  
37 See James Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 
1154 (2004) (“Thus, the typical privacy article rests its case precisely on an appeal to its reader's intuitions 
and anxieties about the evils of privacy violations. Imagine invasions of your privacy, the argument runs. 
Do they not seem like violations of your very personhood? Since violations of privacy seem intuitively 
horrible to everybody, the argument continues, safeguarding privacy must be a legal imperative, just as 
safeguarding property or contract is a legal imperative.”). 
  9 
 This thesis begins in Part I by exploring the concept and value of autonomy, and 
the role it plays as a normative goal in democratic societies. Part I then examines the 
concepts of liberty, dignity and privacy, which are seen as vanguards of the core value of 
autonomy. Each of the three are defined by their own characteristics when applied in the 
legal context, which has important implications for determining how best to describe the 
harm that befalls individuals in the data breach context.  
 Turning back to the data breach context in Part II, this thesis applies the 
understanding of autonomy developed in Part I to each discrete sequence of events that 
occur throughout a data breach. The thesis answers its research questions by (a) 
evaluating the values that are affected by each juncture of a data breach; and (b) whether 
law has typically protected those values in the past, which would justify offering legal 
redress for data breach victims who do not suffer identity theft. Finally, Part III discusses 
the practical importance of this inquiry, arguing that a better articulation of harm is 
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PART I  
II. AUTONOMY 
 This thesis argues that data breaches violate data breach victims’ autonomy. To 
understand this harm, an understanding of autonomy itself is required. Autonomy is a 
broad, “notoriously vague” concept.38 This is in part because the term is used widely, 
discussed in the realms of philosophy, medicine, law, politics, human rights, and even 
robotics.39 To focus on its meaning relevant to this thesis, this section begins by 
examining the concept of autonomy in philosophy and then moves onto examining its 
role in liberal political theory.  
a. Individual Autonomy  
 “Autonomy” literally means “self law”: the Greek autonomia combines autos – 
“self,” with nomos – “law.” The term was first used to describe the Greek city-state; a 
city had autonomia “when its citizens made their own laws, as opposed to being under 
the control of some conquering power.”40 Thus, the term’s original use was political, 
describing the ability and right of nation-states “to administer their own affairs.”41 
Autonomy began to refer to the conduct of individuals only in the nineteenth century.42 
                                                
38 David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991). 
See also Thomas Hill, Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, 18 J. VALUE INQUIRY 251 (1984) (“there is no 
uniform understanding about what autonomy is.”). 
39 Tim Smithers, Autonomy in Robots and Other Agents, 34.1 BRAIN AND COGNITION 88 (1997).  
40 Gerald Dworkin, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12-13 (Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
41 Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will, 116 ETHICS 263 (2006). 
42 Id. 
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 Philosopher Immanuel Kant is widely credited with inspiring a view of 
individuals as “autonomous, rational decision makers able to reason and make choices.”43 
A succinct Kantian definition of autonomy is elusive,44 but a working definition develops 
from Kant’s examination of will, morality, and rationality.  
 Kant began by starting from the familiar premise that humans possessed the 
ability to reason, and that we can use this reason and logic to choose one path of action 
over another.45 In examining the paths available, Kant was concerned with determining 
which human actions could produce objective laws of morality – a “kingdom of ends,” in 
which humans guide their conduct according to some universally held maxims or 
imperatives.46 Kant’s premise was that actions guided by self-interest or individualized 
influences cannot produce universal law because then each person’s actions would 
conflict with those of others.47  
 Humans exercise their will, according to Kant, by acting rationally.48 But 
rationality itself could be guided by base impulses and animalistic instincts.49 Whereas 
                                                
43 Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1714-15 
(2000) (quoting Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Moral 59-67 (J. Beck trans., 1959)). 
44 The most evident may be “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law.” 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 50 (A. Wood trans., Yale University Press 
2002). 
45 Id. at 52. 
46 Id. 
47 Thomas Hill explains that these principles “are self-imposed insofar as they stem from one’s rational 
nature.” Hill, supra note 38 at 255. 
48 Kant, supra note 44 at 29.  
49 Kant believed that “feelings, emotions, habits, and other non-intellectual factors are excluded from 
autonomous decision-making. Any circumstances that particularize us are also excluded from autonomous 
  12 
choice guided by pure reason is “free choice,” choice that can be determined “only by 
inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice.”50 Thus, Kant supposed 
a spectrum of rationality. On one end, we behave purely out of immediate, almost 
reflexive self-interest, or at the dictate of another. At the other, we act to conform 
ourselves with principles and maxims because of their moral worth and universality, 
which exist from their being product of one’s unadulterated reason.51 Acting out of “fear 
of punishment, desire for approval, blind acceptance of tradition, animal instinct,” and 
other factors is, in one sense, rational, because we divine some benefit from each.52 But 
those factors coerce our will because they substitute acting solely to accord with some 
universal, moral law with the desire to act in a way that benefits only the individual.53  
 Kant’s autonomy, then, is the exercise of one’s will in accordance with universal 
law, or higher-order principles and maxims. One is autonomous when he or she acts with 
pure reason free from constraining factors that would corrupt his or her otherwise purely 
                                                                                                                                            
decision-making.” Moral Autonomy, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (accessed Feb. 16, 
2015). 
50 Immanuel Kant, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAL 42 (M. Gregor trans., Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
51 Kant illustrates how the motive for one’s actions indicates the presence or lack of autonomy through an 
example of why two people would refrain from lying. See Kant supra note 44 at 58-59. Kant explains that 
the person who refrains from lying out of a desire to “retain [his] honorable reputation” is influenced by 
self-interest, whereas the person who refrains from lying “even if [he] did not incur the least disgrace” is 
autonomous. Id.  
52 Hill supra note 38 at 255. 
53 Id.  
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rational decisions. Thus, autonomy is closely associated with freedom and liberty.54 Kant 
himself defined autonomy in terms of negative freedom: acting in accordance with one’s 
will separate from external constraining influences.55 Negative freedom allows 
individuals to be “capable of causing events without being causally determined to do 
so.”56  
 Reflecting on Kant’s writing, Professor Gerald Dworkin notes that autonomy can 
be thought of as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-
order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and [as] the capacity to accept or attempt 
to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values.”57 “By exercising such a 
capacity,” Dworkin writes, “persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to 
their lives, and take responsibility for the kinds of person they are.”58 Professor Joseph 
Raz writes that “autonomous persons are those who can shape their life and determine its 
course. They are not merely rational agents who can choose between options after 
evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt personal projects, 
                                                
54 Some scholars suggest Kant viewed them interchangeably. See, e.g., Roger J. Sullivan, IMMANUEL 
KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 46 (Cambridge University Press, 1989) (“In Kant’s moral theory it is usually 
possible to use the word “autonomy” in place of freedom.”). 
55 Kant supra note 44, at 63 (“The concept of freedom is the key to the definition of autonomy of the will. 
The will is a species of causality of living beings, insofar as they are rational, and freedom would be that 
quality of this causality by which it can be effective independently of alien causes determining it; just as 
natural necessity is the quality of the causality of all beings lacking reason, of being determined to activity 
through the influence of alien causes. The proposed definition of freedom is negative . . .”).  
56 Hill, supra note 38, at 255. 
57 Dworkin, supra note 40, at 20.  
58 Id.  
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develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through which their personal 
integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete.”59  
a. Freedom from Coercion, Manipulation, and Deception 
 Kant’s discussion on autonomy has been enormously influential, and scholars 
have wrestled with his outlay of autonomy since. In so doing, important themes have 
emerged. Notable among them is that autonomy assumes choice and decision-making – 
humans exercise autonomy by deciding our best path pursuant to some moral guide.60 
Two important caveats determine the quality of decision, however, and therefore the 
ability to express autonomy. For one, the choice must not be coerced.61 In addition, one 
must operate in an environment in which the quality of options is sufficient for the 
individual to exercise meaningful choice.62 
 First, coercion is antithetical to autonomy, since “[a]ll coercion invades autonomy 
by subjecting the will of the coerced.”63As Raz explains, coercion is A forcing B to do 
                                                
59 Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 154 (Clarendon Press, 1986). Joel Feinberg broadly defines 
personal autonomy as “either (i) the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a matter of degree; or 
(ii) the actual condition of self-government and its associated virtues; or (iii) an ideal of character derived 
from that conception; or (iv) (on the analogy to a political state) the sovereign authority to govern oneself, 
which is absolute within one's own moral “boundaries.”” Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and 
Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 447 (1983). 
60 Raz, supra note 59, at 204 (“A person is autonomous only if he has a variety of acceptable options 
available to him to choose from, and his life became as it is through his choice of some of these options. A 
person who has never had any significant choice, or was not aware of it, or never exercised choice in 
significant matters but simply drifted through life is not an autonomous person.”). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 155.  
63 Id.  
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something against B’s will.64 By doing so, A subjects B to A’s will, thereby interfering 
with B’s own process for determining B’s own best path.65 Raz notes that coercion can 
still be present even when the person being coerced does not regret the actions he or she 
takes; “[i]t is enough that he regrets the circumstances which make him do it.”66 Even if 
the action seems justified by some apparent logic, the reasoning can still amount to 
coercion: “It is justified if the reasons for it, including the threat of harm if it is not 
undertaken, defeat the reasons against it, including the fact that undertaking it amounts to 
submitting to coercion which violates the agent’s autonomy.”67  
 The second factor determining the quality of choice is the nature of options 
available. Raz explains that “[i]f having an autonomous life is an ultimate value, then 
having a sufficient range of acceptable options is of intrinsic value, for it is constitutive of 
an autonomous life that it is lived in circumstances where acceptable alternative are 
present.”68 Professor Thomas Hill similarly argues that even if an individual possesses 
the requisite features to exercise autonomy – chief among them “the psychological 
capacities for rational decision making” – the environment in which one operates can 
nevertheless constrain the ability to actually act autonomously.69 Individuals, Hill 
explains, “though rationally disposed to make the best of their situation and unhindered 
                                                
64 Id. A more detailed articulation is provided at page 149.  
65 Id. at 154. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 151-52.  
68 Id. at 205. 
69 Hill, supra note 38, at 260-61. 
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by threats and manipulation by others . . . might be severely confined in the choices they 
could make by widespread poverty, disease, overpopulation, and absence of technology 
and culture.”70 A person’s opportunity to live autonomously is reduced if, for example, 
“one has to labor in the fields all day to survive” even if that reality is no one’s fault.71 
“The choice to labor may be perfectly rational, of course; but it may be almost the only 
rational choice one has a chance to make.”72 Raz argues that to produce meaningful 
choice, “[t]he criteria of the adequacy of the options available to a person must meet 
several distinct concerns. They should include options with long-term pervasive 
consequences as well as short-term options of little consequence, and a fair spread in 
between.”73  
 Together, these two factors help form the contours of a definition of autonomy as 
a right, and not solely a value: the right to be free from undue coercion or manipulation 
by another.74 Manipulation or deception distort the information one receives, thereby 
frustrating a person’s process of determining, with their rationality, how best to respond 
                                                
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 261 (1984). Raz expresses the same idea with his parable of the Hounded Woman, in which a 
woman is deserted on a small island shared only with a “fierce carnivorous beast.” In a life of fear from the 
animal, the woman exerts all her intellectual ingenuity and will power to the struggle of how to survive, 
and thus lives without autonomy: while she operates with choice – she may have “medium and long-term 
options all dominated by her one overpowering need and desire to escape being devoured by the beast” – 
the choice is hollow “because a choice between survival and death is no choice from our perspective . . . 
For most of the time the choice should not be dominated by the need to protect the life one has.” Raz, supra 
note 59, at 376. See also Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1424 (2000) (“autonomy is radically contingent upon environment and 
circumstance.”). 
73 Raz, supra note 59, at 376. 
74 Thomas Hill, Autonomy and Agency, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 853 (1999). 
  17 
and live one’s life toward his or her guiding principles. Coercion results when one acts in 
some way that diverges from how he or she otherwise would act free from the influence.  
b. Autonomy as a Normative Value  
 Humans are endowed with the basic tool of rationality, according to Kant, but 
autonomy is an end to strive for. To that end, Kant believed the role of government was 
to foster, protect, and nurture autonomy.75 Government protects and nurtures autonomy 
through the enforcement of its laws, ensuring that one persons’ self-development and 
exercise of autonomy do not impede others’.76 And in codifying its citizens’ social 
norms, moral duties, and expected behaviors, law bears its citizens’ imprimatur.77 
Democracies thus seek to ensure that their citizens self-determination flourishes to the 
extent it does not infringe on others, and that the law and legislation serve as “the 
communicative framework for a rational political will formation,” expressing “the 
common will of freely associated legal persons.”78 
                                                
75 Sullivan, supra note 54, at 234.  
76 See generally Feinberg, note 59.  
77 Jurgen Habermas, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 105-06 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press, 1996) (“Moral theory supplies the overarching 
concepts: will and free choice, action and incentive, duty and inclination, law and legislation serve in the 
first place to characterize moral judgment and action . . . democracy should establish a procedure of 
legitimate lawmaking. Specifically, the democratic principle states that only those statutes may claim 
legitimacy that can meet with the assent . . . of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn 
has been legally constituted. In other words, this principle explains the performative meaning of the 
practice of self-determination on the part of legal consociates who recognize one another as free and equal 
members of an association they have joined voluntarily. Thus the principle of democracy lies at another 
level than the moral principle.”).  
78 Id. at 111.  
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 Following Kant’s writing, western liberal political theory has considered 
autonomy a normative value for individuals to obtain and for governments to foster.79  
Democracies are founded on the “fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual, 
in his basic dignity and worth . . . and in the need to maintain social processes that 
safeguard his sacred individuality.”80 This individuality is a necessary ingredient in a 
democracy, which depends upon its citizens acquiring knowledge, using the knowledge 
to reason, and in turning their reasoned thoughts into beliefs acted upon to direct society. 
In order to maintain individuality, citizens must be free from manipulation or coercion.81 
Thus, autonomy is seen as a basic building block from which the whole system of 
representative democracy is built. 
 
II. AUTONOMY IN AMERICAN LAW: LIBERTY, DIGNITY, AND PRIVACY 
 The word “autonomy” does not explicitly appear in the Constitution, but it is 
understood to be both embedded in the constitutional design and valued by the courts.82 
                                                
79 See, e.g., John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 513-20 (1971) (“A well ordered society affirms the 
autonomy of persons.”). See also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1609, 1654 (1999) (democracy “requires individuals with an underlying capacity to form and act on 
their notions of the good in deciding how to live their lives. This anti-totalitarian principle stands as a 
bulwark against any coercive standardization of the individual.”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of 
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980) (describing “the moral autonomy of the citizen” as “a central 
requirement of a democracy.”) 
80 Westin, supra note 1, at 33. 
81 Id. (“Psychologists and sociologists have linked the development and maintenance of this sense of 
individuality to the human need for autonomy – the desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly 
by others.”).  
82 James Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (autonomy is “rooted” in 
“the language and design of our Constitution.”); Winick, supra note 43, at 1707-08 (“respect for individual 
autonomy is deeply rooted in American constitutional history and tradition.”). 
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Set amid British tyranny, the early American political thinkers formed a government 
based on the consent of the governed, in which citizens would form a representative 
democracy that respected their capacity and ability to govern themselves through a 
representative system.83 The major threat to freedom and autonomy, at the nation’s 
founding, “was the inability to have some say in the decisions that affected important 
aspects of one’s life.”84 The Founding Fathers thus crafted a Constitution reflecting 
humans’ innate capacity85 to determine their best path “in pursuit of happiness.”  
 As such an integral value of American governance, one might expect a robust 
“autonomy” jurisprudence to have developed.86 However, no doubt influenced by the fact 
that the term does not appear in the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has never 
recognized a specific “right to autonomy” nor developed a clearly bound jurisprudence 
around the term. As noted above, autonomy is simply too broad a term around which to 
develop a system of rights.87  
                                                
83 Perhaps the most well known manifestation of this demand for voice and consent was the colonists’ cry 
for “no taxation without representation.” See Jennifer Nedelsky, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL 
THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW 127 (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
84 Id.  
85 Thomas Jefferson, in particular, was influenced by the belief that the law of nature produced innately 
rational people capable of exercising autonomy. Garrett W. Sheldon, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 42-6 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
86 The Supreme Court has, at times, recognized autonomy as a fundamental value. See, e.g., Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (U.S. 1983) (discussing “the values of individual autonomy and dignity central 
to many constitutional rights, especially those Fifth and Sixth Amendment.”). The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence of dignity and autonomy interests in the Bill of Rights is discussed more, infra.  
87 For instance, the Supreme Court balances “state autonomy” when weighing state versus federal law. See, 
e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (U.S. 1985) (“[The] Constitution of the 
United States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States – independence in 
their legislative and independence in their judicial departments.”).  
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 Instead, autonomy is valued, protected, and nurtured in American law by three 
separate (though often related) derivative values: liberty, dignity, and privacy. The 
sections below argue that autonomy manifested in action is considered liberty; that the 
space required to exercise autonomy is protected as privacy; and that autonomy itself, or 
self-determination, is protected as dignity. Each of these is similar, yet has key 
differences both conceptually and in American jurisprudence. Articulating the similarities 
and differences aids in ultimately identifying the unique harm victims suffer in the wake 
of data breaches. 
a. Liberty  
 To say liberty is derivative of autonomy is a contentious claim, because Kant 
himself seemed to view them as similar, if not identical.88 Yet since his time, 
philosophers and scholars have articulated important differences.  
i. Relation to Autonomy 
 Liberty, unlike autonomy, is usually used to connote freedom of action as 
opposed to the process of deciding to do an intended action.89 It is “a concept that applies 
to the desires and preferences a person has for particular states of affairs. It focuses on 
what the person wants to do at the level of action.”90 This is different from autonomy, 
                                                
88 See supra note 38.  
89 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 40, at 105 (Liberty is “the ability to of a person to effectuate his decisions 
in action.”).  
90 Id. 
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which is citizens’ “capacity to reflect upon and adopt attitudes toward their desires, 
wishes, and values.”91  
 Dworkin illustrates this difference by way of example. When we deceive a 
prisoner, we are interfering with his autonomy but not his liberty. The person who is “put 
into a cell and convinced that all the doors are locked (when, in fact, one is left unlocked) 
is free to leave the cell.”92 But “because he cannot – given his information – avail himself 
of this opportunity, his ability to do what he wishes is limited.”93 The prisoner is 
technically at liberty to leave, but by being duped into thinking all doors were locked, his 
autonomy is reduced, affecting his ability to be free.94  
 Conversely, an individual’s liberty can be interfered with without violating that 
person’s autonomy. Although examples of this dynamic may be difficult to imagine,95 
Dworkin offers another example, this time from The Iliad:  
Not wanting to be lured onto the rocks by the siren, Odysseus commands 
his men to tie him to the mast and refuse all later orders he might give to 
be set free. He wants to have his liberty limited so that he and his men will 
survive. Although his behavior at the time he hears the siren is not free – 
he struggles against his bonds and orders his men to free him – there is 
another aspect of his conduct that must be understood . . . He has a 
preference about his preferences, a desire not to act upon certain desires. 
He views the desire to steer his ship toward the sirens, and the rocks, as an 
alien desire. In limiting his liberty in accordance with his wishes we 
                                                
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 14. 
94 Id.  
95 Perhaps because “we are used to focusing on cases where a person wishes to be free from interference, 
resents having his liberty taken away.” Id. at 106.  
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promote, not hinder, his efforts to define the contours of his life. We 
promote his autonomy by denying him liberty.96  
 
 This example clarifies the division between liberty (or freedom) and autonomy: 
liberty can be thought of as the freedom to act a certain way. Autonomy, on the other 
hand, can be described as the antecedent process one must undergo in order to freely 
decide whether to do a certain thing. In this way, freedom is dependent upon autonomy, 
and can be seen as a second-order value.97 Conceptually, then, autonomy is often coupled 
with liberty, because one often decides some course of conduct (thereby exercising 
autonomy) and then actually acts upon that decision (exercising liberty). When applied to 
law, liberty can be seen as protecting autonomy by protecting whichever act stems from a 
decision-making process – in short, by protecting autonomy’s physical manifestation.  
ii. Liberty in American Law  
 It is difficult to understate the value of liberty in American law. The Constitution 
itself is intended to secure the “[b]lessings of [l]iberty,”98 and the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees that citizens’ liberty will not be deprived without due process of law.99 
                                                
96 Id. Joseph Feinberg offers another example: “The alcoholic . . . may have an intense desire to choose not 
to have another drink, but when his host returns with the bottle, he finds himself, to his despair, choosing 
contrary to his own wishes. Such a person may have freedom of action (for whatever that is worth), 
including political liberty (the law neither required nor prohibited another drink), but he lacked freedom of 
choice. He was free to act as he chose, but not free to choose as he wished.” Feinberg, supra note 59, at 
462.  
97 Id. (“The extent of our defacto freedom of action is determined not by any characteristics or powers of 
ourselves. Rather it is entirely a function of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Insofar as those 
circumstances contain open options, just to that extent do we have freedom of action . . . A person has an 
open option in respect to some possible action, x, when nothing in his objective circumstances prevents him 
from doing x if he should choose, and nothing in his objective circumstances requires him to do x if he 
should choose not to.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
98 U.S. Const., preamble.  
99 U.S. Const. amend IV.  
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Because of this explicit endorsement of liberty, it is fair to say Americans operate as 
though they can act in whichever way pleases them, so long as their actions cannot be 
said to infringe on another’s autonomy or liberty.100 The government protects this default 
presumption – that individuals are free to act according to their own desires – against the 
actions of other private actors through myriad laws, codes, regulations, and rules 
designed to deter harmful conduct. Against government coercion itself, the Due Process 
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment commands that legislation tending to 
impinge liberty be “rationally related” to some “legitimate” government objective.101  
 Autonomy interests are especially evident, in the guise of liberty protections, 
when particularly significant decisions are made regarding how to conduct one’s life. The 
Supreme Court’s “due process” and “equal protection” decisions bear this out. The Fifth 
Amendment, prohibiting the government from depriving any person of life, liberty or 
property without “due process of law” was originally thought of as providing procedural 
protections only.102 But the concept “expanded, particularly after the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, to protect substantive liberty and property interests from 
arbitrary governmental deprivation.”103 “Liberty,” in particular, was expanded to protect 
                                                
100 This basic premise is echoed in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, which influenced the Fourteenth 
Amendment, passed 9 years later. See John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY 13 (C. Shields ed., 1956) (“[T]he only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant . . . 
Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”).  
101 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1993). 
102 Winick, supra note 43, at 1717. 
103 Id. 
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various economic and personal liberties.104 These included the upbringing of children, 
marriage, procreation, and other areas of personal life.105 As Professor Bruce Winick 
notes, “[b]etween government and the individual, substantive due process carves out an 
area in which the individual is left substantially free to control important aspects of his or 
her own life.”106 In each of these realms of life – marriage, education, relationships – 
“liberty” interest protect both the capacity and ability for people to decide how to live 
their lives, while also protecting the concomitant action itself.  
 For example, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,107 decided shortly after the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute on the 
grounds that it violated the plaintiff’s “right to contract.”108 The Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “liberty” protected the plaintiff’s right to “be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties,” including the right “to use them in all lawful ways; to live 
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; [and] to pursue any 
livelihood or avocation.”109 Thus, liberty protected both the right to use one’s faculties to 
                                                
104 Id. See also Immanuel Kant, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 387 (ed. and trans. M. Gregor, 1996). 
105 Winick, supra note 43, at 1737 (“In a number of areas . . . by invoking either the rubric of “privacy” or 
the concept of “liberty” the Supreme Court has recognized that due process protects a zone of autonomous 
decision making in matters that are personal and intimate and of extreme importance to the individual – 
those matters dealing with marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, family relationships, child 
rearing and education, occupation, residence, travel, and health.”).  
106 Id. at 1743. 
107 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (U.S. 1897). 
108 Id. at 591.  
109 Id. at 589.  
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decide how to live one’s life – specifically, which profession to enter into – and the 
concomitant right to work in that profession free from certain constraints.  
 The right to autonomy is thus “a unifying theme that shows the coherence and 
structure of certain substantive liberties on a list of familiar unenumerated fundamental 
rights” such as those articulated under the Supreme Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence.110 The protection of autonomy through “liberty” is not confined to the Bill 
of Rights.111 The foundation of private contract law, for example, is built on the notion of 
private autonomy and individual self-determination.112 The government “recognize[s] the 
desirability of allowing individuals to regulate, to a large extent, their own affairs,” 
granting individuals “the power to bind themselves by expression of their intent to be 
bound.”113  
b. Privacy    
 Privacy is also derivative of autonomy. Privacy joins autonomy and dignity as 
being notoriously difficult to define.114 However, most definitions focus on secrecy, 
anonymity, or seclusion.115 Each of these relate to the control a person has over his or her 
                                                
110 Winick, supra note 43, at 1743 (internal quotations omitted). 
111 Id. at 1753 (“the principle of autonomy also permeates much of American law outside of the 
Constitution.”) 
112 Id. (noting the “strong commitment to individual autonomy . . . reflected in the history and development 
of the law of contracts.”)  
113 Id. 
114 Judith Thomson quipped that “[N]obody seems to have any very clear idea what [it] is.” See Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4.4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS, 295 (1975). 
115 Ruth Gavison defined privacy as secrecy, anonymity, or seclusion. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the 
Limits of Law 89 YALE L. J. 421, 479 (1980).  
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accessibility to the outside world.116 Secrecy and anonymity keep information and 
identity about oneself from others, while seclusion concerns the ability to keep some zone 
of self – either spatial or mental – to oneself. 
i. Relation to Autonomy 
 Privacy protects and nurtures autonomy by giving people the space (secrecy, 
anonymity, or seclusion) needed to make decisions according to their own beliefs, and 
thereby engage in self-determination.117 Professor Alan Westin spoke of privacy as a sort 
of cloak that protects the inner core of a person’s autonomy: “only grave social need can 
ever justify destruction of the privacy which guards the individual’s ultimate 
autonomy.”118 Professor Julie Cohen describes privacy as “shorthand for breathing room 
to engage in the processes of boundary management that enable and constitute self-
development” thereby “foster[ing] (partial) self-determination.”119 Professor Clinton 
Rossiter speaks of privacy as a “special kind of independence, which can be understood 
as an attempt to secure autonomy in at least a few personal and spiritual concerns, if 
necessary in defiance of all the pressures of modern society.”120 Professor Ruth Gavison 
                                                
116 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 40, at 103 (“Privacy consists of the ability of an individual to maintain 
control of the information about himself that is available to others.”); Mark Alfino & G. Randolph 
Mayes, Reconstructing the Right to Privacy, 29 SOC. THEORY & PRACTICE 1, 8 (2003) (“Our basic view is 
that privacy is the condition of having secured personal space, personal space is the space a person requires 
to reason, and individuals have a fundamental moral right to reason as a means of securing personal 
autonomy.”). 
117 Id. at 6 (“Privacy plays a fundamental and ineliminable role in constructing personal autonomy.”). 
118 Westin, supra note 1, at 292. See also id. at 296 (referring to privacy as a “function” performed for 
personal autonomy). 
119 Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2012).  
120 Clinton Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY 15 (Konvitz and Rossiter eds., Cornell 
University Press, 1958).  
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too believes autonomy is furthered through the protection of privacy.121 Professor Helen 
Nissenbaum writes that “insofar as privacy, understood as a constraint on access to 
people through information, frees us from the stultifying effects of scrutiny and 
approbation (or disapprobation), it contributes to material conditions for the development 
and exercise of autonomy and freedom in thought and action.”122 
 Though privacy protects autonomy, the two are conceptually distinct.123 This is 
because of the way privacy has been conceptualized, and the characteristics of privacy 
that have developed over time, such as anonymity, seclusion, or secrecy. For example, as 
Dworkin notes, deception can invade autonomy but not a person’s privacy.124 Deception 
corrupts information that a person receives, thereby interfering with that person’s ability 
to decide upon a certain path – but it does not invade a person’s privacy. Accordingly, 
deception is “just the opposite kind from that involved in interference with privacy. What 
is controlled is the information coming to you, not the information coming from you. I do 
not know something about you that you might wish to conceal [which would implicate 
                                                
121 See Gavison, supra note 115, at 423 (describing privacy as promoting “liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and 
human relations, and furthering the existence of a free society.”). 
122 Helen Nissenbaum, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 
82 (Stanford University Press, 2010). Conceptually, “if privacy is understood as the claim or right to 
control or determine access to information about oneself, and autonomy is understood as self-determination 
embodied in the individual whose actions are governed by principles that are his own, and who subjects his 
principles to critical review, rather than taking them over unexamined form his social environment, then 
privacy is, in fact, partially constitutive of autonomy . . . privacy is to be understood as a form of autonomy, 
[as] self-determination with respect to information about oneself.” Id. at 81 (internal quotations omitted).  
123 Dworkin, supra note 40, at 104 (“[A]lthough privacy may be related to autonomy in a number of ways it 
is not identical with it.”).  
124 Id.   
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privacy]. I conceal something from you that you might wish to know.”125 Thus, autonomy 
is diminished, but not privacy.  
ii. Privacy in American Law  
 Privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution. Yet, the Constitution grants a right 
to privacy, the invasion of privacy is a well-recognized tort, and myriad legislation has 
been enacted in the name of privacy. This robust presence can be fairly traced to one law 
review article.  
 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy126 has been considered 
the spring of privacy law in the United States.127 Writing in 1890, Warren and Brandeis 
set forth an argument for why man enjoyed a “right to be let alone,” and explained how 
this right was being infringed upon by “[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprise” that were invading “the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”128 The 
authors argued that man, “under the refining influence of culture,” had become “more 
sensitive to publicity” such that “solitude and privacy” had become more valuable.129 At 
the same time, society, with its new technology and gossip press, was encroaching on this 
privacy interest as it had not before. The authors argued that common law, in its “eternal 
                                                
125 Id. at 105.  
126 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandies, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) 
127 See, e.g., Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right 
to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002) (framing “The Right to Privacy” as the “seminal force in the 
development of a ‘right to privacy’ in American law.”) But see Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, 
Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007) (arguing that “The 
Right to Privacy” reflected a divergence from the privacy-protecting law of confidentiality).  
128 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 126, at 195. 
129 Id. at 193, 196.  
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youth” had evolved to protect not merely physical property and liberty interests, but also 
intellectual ones.130 So too, they argued, could it protect individuals’ “right to be let 
alone.”131  
 Since their influential writing, courts slowly began to develop jurisprudence 
around this newfound “right to privacy.” In 1960, Dean Prosser, an influential legal 
scholar, grouped together the cases and eventually formulated the “Invasion of Privacy” 
tort, itself composed of four distinct torts: Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into 
private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity which places a 
person in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of name or likeness.132 These 
torts exist at common law today in many states, and continue to be used in myriad 
scenarios to protect individuals’ privacy interests – including in the data breach context. 
Prosser stated that the interest protected in each tort was, in the intrusion cases, the 
interest in freedom from mental distress; in the public disclosure and “false light” cases, 
the interest in reputation; and in the appropriation cases, the proprietary interest in name 
and likeness.133 
                                                
130 Id. at 194 (“[I]n very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and 
property, for trespasses vi et arrmis. Then the “right to life” served only to protect the subject from battery 
in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the right to property secured to the 
individual his lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings 
and his intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to 
mean the right to enjoy life -the right to be let alone.”). 
131 Id.  
132 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
133 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 962, 967 (1964) (citing Prosser, supra note 132).  
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 Although the Constitution does not explicitly contain the term “privacy,” the 
Supreme Court has found that the Constitution bestows a right to privacy. In Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that Bill of Rights contained “penumbras,” creating 
“zones of privacy.”134 These penumbral privacy zones included the First Amendment’s 
right of association, the Third Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering of 
soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s right to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, “enable[ing] the citizen 
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his 
detriment.”135 
 This Constitutional right to privacy arguably extends to so-called “informational 
privacy.” In Whalen v. Roe, plaintiffs challenged a government program that retained 
identifying information of patients who had been prescribed certain drugs in a centralized 
file.136 The plaintiffs argued that the program violated their Constitutional right to 
privacy.137 The Court held that the program did not constitute an invasion “of any right or 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”138 In so doing, the Court noted that the 
government had the authority to collect certain sensitive information, but that the power 
is “typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures” and that the duty also “arguably has its roots in the 
                                                
134 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (U.S. 1965). 
135 Id. 
136 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (U.S. 1977). 
137 Id. at 598. 
138 Id. at 603-04.  
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Constitution.”139 Since Whalen, the circuit courts have taken various stances toward this 
right to informational privacy.140  
 Finally, various statutes have been enacted with the goal of protecting peoples’ 
privacy. These include those designed to maintain the confidentiality of certain 
information,141 to prevent wiretapping and eavesdropping,142 and to protect personal 
zones of seclusion, free from interference by the outside world.143  
c. Dignity 
 The final derivative value of autonomy is dignity. Dignity is an ethereal, 
capacious concept, but its basis lies “in the autonomy of self and a self-worth that is 
reflected in every human being’s right to individual self-determination.”144 
 Dignity is ancient, tracing back to Cicero who believed “all human beings were 
endowed with dignitas, and that therefore all mankind is worthy of respect for the sole 
                                                
139 Id. at 605. See also National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) 
(“We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in 
Whalen . . .”).  
140 Compare AFL-CIO v. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing 
“grave doubts as to the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal 
information.”) with United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.1980) 
(recognizing the right and applying a multifactor test to determine whether the government has invaded it).  
141 See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (protecting confidentiality of 
video rental records); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (2006) (protecting the 
confidentiality of financial information.) 
142 See, e.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. 
143 See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Congressional finding that 
“Unrestricted telemarketing . . . can be an intrusive invasion of privacy.”).  
144 Rex Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 68 (2011). See also Immanuel 
Kant, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54 (Lewis White Beck trans., 
1983) (“Autonomy is thus the basis of the dignity of both human nature and every rational nature.”). 
  32 
fact of its existence.”145 All humans were endowed with dignity, according to Cicero, 
simply because of our “superior minds” which allowed for our self-awareness.146 
Through the ages, Cicero’s view was eclipsed first by the Roman elite, which had vested 
interests in conceptualizing dignity not as a universal trait but as an acquired one, 
indicative of “high social or political status.”147 Then during the Renaissance, religious 
authorities regarded dignity as endowed in each of us, but as a gift from God, as humans 
made in His image.148  
i. Relation to Autonomy  
 Kant, regarded as the father of the modern concept of dignity, secularized the 
concept of dignity and articulated it “as a normative legal ideal.”149 Like Cicero, Kant 
believed humans possessed dignity stemming from rationality, but differed from Cicero 
in that he “formulated reason as the ability of humans to appreciate the implications or 
universality of their actions.”150 
 Kant believed dignity was an outgrowth of autonomy, and that an affront to 
autonomy would therefore be an indignity. His first Categorical Imperative instructs 
people to “act only according to principles which can be conceived and willed as a 
                                                
145 Glensy, supra note 144, at 76 (citing Cicero, DE OFFICIIS I 30 (William McCartney ed., Edinburgh 
1798) (1481)).  
146 Glensy, supra note 144, at 76. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 74-5. This remains a core belief. See, e.g., Catholic Church, The Dignity of the Human Person, in 
THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (2nd ed., 1700) (“The dignity of the human person is rooted in 
his creation in the image and likeness of God.”). 
149 Glensy, supra note 144, at 76. 
150 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 655, 678. 
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universal law.”151 Derivatively, his second implores individuals to “[a]ct in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always 
at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”152 As John Castiglione notes, 
violating the second precept affronts human dignity “because every individual has a right 
to be treated as an end, not as a means.”153 Thus, dignity “can be conceived as the 
inherent right of all men to be treated by others in accordance with the categorical 
imperative. Failure to be so treated is an offense against dignity.”154 Roger Sullivan casts 
Kant’s second imperative as the Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons.155  
 In addition to being a status inhering in each person as a product of his or her 
rationality, dignity also accrues from the exercise of that rationality free from undue 
interference – in short, from the exercise of autonomy.156 Thus, actions that restrict the 
exercise of autonomy – coercion, deception, or manipulation – are said to violate a 
person’s dignity.  
 
                                                
151 Immanuel Kant, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54 (Lewis White Beck trans., 1983). 
152 Id.  
153 Castiglione, supra note 150, at 678. 
154 Id. 
155 Sullivan, supra note 54, at 195. Sullivan writes that “The imperative that we should act only maxims 
capable of being universal laws, [according to Kant], inevitably will lead to our recognizing that we must 
respect every human person as having objective and intrinsic worth or dignity.” Id. at 193.  
156 Darwall, supra note 41, at 275 (“The very idea of a claim to autonomy thus implies the authority to 
make the claim second-personally. And if we see this claim as inherent in the equal dignity of persons, we 
are consequently committed to accepting that dignity includes a second-personal authority, specifically, 
that it includes the authority to demand respect for autonomy and to hold one another accountable for 
complying with this demand. We must see ourselves as accountable to one another as members of the 
moral community for respecting others’ autonomy and as distinctively accountable to those whose 
autonomy we threaten or violate.”) (emphasis added). 
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ii. Dignity in American Law  
 Unlike liberty, “dignity” does not appear in the Constitution.157 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has used the term often,158 and proclaimed that “[f]rom its founding the 
Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons 
within its borders.”159 
  Professor Maxine Goodman, in a survey of the Supreme Court’s use of the term, 
found that the Court had “expressly linked human dignity to certain constitutional claims, 
either by grounding the Court’s decision in the need to advance human dignity or by 
expressly rejecting human dignity concerns in favor of competing state interests.”160 As 
Professor Rex Glensy notes, the Supreme Court’s use of the term seems to point to two 
separate conceptualizations of dignity – each of which can be tied to Kantian conception 
                                                
157 Notably, though, the very first Federalist Paper called for the Constitution to ensure “liberty,” “dignity” 
and “happiness” of the people. See Glensy, supra note 144, at 77 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, 4 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)). 
158 See generally Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 
NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006).  
159 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
160 Goodman found that the cases fell into eight categories: “1. Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, and 
corresponding right to privacy, regarding marriage, contraception, intimate acts, and procreation; 2. 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection under the law regarding equal access to education and 
accommodations; 3. Fifth Amendment protection against a person in a criminal case serving as a witness 
against himself; 4. Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; 5. Eighth 
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment; 6. An individual’s ability under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection Clause to choose how and when to die when 
death is imminent; 7. Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection right to economic assistance 
from the government; and 8. First Amendment freedom of expression and the opposing right of an 
individual to protect his public image, as against another's First Amendment freedom of speech.” 
Goodman, supra note 158, at 757. 
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of dignity as (a) a fundamental byproduct of human rationality; and (b) a status achieved 
through self-determination.161  
1. Treating a person with decency 
 First, dignity is employed in the Fourth and Eighth Amendment contexts as a 
measure of a minimum threshold of respect each individual is due, often with a physical 
aspect. In Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court ruled that tying a prisoner to a hitching post 
in the sun for more than seven hours, supplying him with little water, and preventing him 
from going to the toilet was a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment.162 The punishment was “antithetical to human dignity” because 
it was “degrading and dangerous.”163 As Glensy notes, the Court “focused on the 
demeaning aspect of the punishment, which included taunting and wanton humiliation of 
the prisoner.”164 This sense of dignity is Kantian in its dictate that people – even heinous 
criminals – “not be treated as objects.”165 But it does not seem to implicate the Kantian 
imperative of free choice so central to autonomy. The prisoner who is tied up to the post 
has his liberty restricted, to be sure, but he is arguably as autonomous as he was before 
being tied up.166  
                                                
161 Glensy, supra note 144, at 89. 
162 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002).  
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 See supra, note 89.  
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 The same goes for the Court’s conception of dignity in the Fourth Amendment 
context. The Court has framed the Fourth Amendment’s “overriding function” as being 
“to protect privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State” and 
“characterize[s] police behavior as offensive to human dignity when it [rises] to the level 
of shocking even those of hardened sensibilities.”167 Here too, the dignity the Court refers 
to seems less about being free to decide one’s best course of action – autonomy as self-
definition – and more about the government displaying a basic modicum of respect to 
individuals. This conception of dignity, as Glensy notes, is “dignity as basic decency.”168 
Glensy makes the point that in each of these cases, “the actions complained of actually 
invaded the physical body of the individual – indeed, in each case, the actions included 
forcibly going inside the body of the person. Thus, dignity in this context is paired with 
physical integrity.”169 
2. Freedom from coercion or deception 
 The second use of “dignity” in the Court’s jurisprudence is more closely linked to 
self-determination and the freedom to determine one’s path in life. In its substantive due 
process cases, the Court “equates dignity with the respect owed to the core characteristics 
of an individual’s personality and . . . the expression of those characteristics.”170 Most 
                                                
167 Glensy, supra note 144, at 89 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952)) (quotations 
omitted).  
168 Id. at 93.  
169 Id. at 90. This is similar to the German conception of dignity as “respect of physical identity and 
integrity,” delineated in Article 2(2) of the German Constitution. See Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, 
Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law, 4 UTAH L. REV. 963, 975 (1997).  
170 Glensy, supra note 144, at 90.  
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notably, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated an anti−sodomy statute on due 
process grounds.171 The majority could have ruled on other grounds, but instead invoked 
dignity by holding that the statute interfered with “the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,” 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.172 In contrast to the dignity as basic decency, 
described above, these dignity invocations can be seen as protecting people’s ability to 
conduct their life as they see fit.173 
 Invocations of dignity harms appear in other situations where a person’s 
decisional autonomy is at stake. Among state constitutions, the Montana Constitution is 
unique in recognizing dignity, stating in Article II, section 4 that “the dignity of the 
human being is inviolable.”174 Plaintiffs most frequently cite to this “dignity clause” to 
argue that the state government has not protected basic decency requirements for 
prisoners – reflecting the conception of dignity related to self-respect but less to do with 
decision-making and control of one’s choices.175 However, in Oberg v. City of Billings, a 
police officer challenged the Department’s requirement that he take a polygraph test for 
                                                
171 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). 
172 Id. at 574. 
173 Glensy, supra note 144, at 93 (describing this as “dignity as autonomy”).  
174 Mont. Const., Art. II § 4. Two other state constitutions explicitly reference dignity: Illinois and 
Louisiana. The language is “purely hortatory,” however, and not used to create a cause of action as it has 
been in Montana. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and 
Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 21, fn. 21 (2004). 
175 Id.  
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employment as violating the dignity clause.176 The court sided with the officer, striking 
down the lie-detector test on other grounds,177 but also noted that the requirement could 
have been invalidated under the dignity clause because “subjecting one to a lie detector 
test is an affront to one’s dignity.”178 Although the court’s rationale was unexplained, this 
conclusion would seem to align with a Kantian conception of indignity as violating one’s 
self-determination; restricting a person’s right to control which information they withhold 
and extracting their own thoughts from him or her violates self-determination.179  
 Dignity also appears as a value to be protected, not just against government action 
(as in the Eighth and Fourth Amendment context described above) but also against 
private actors. The most prominent example may be so-called “Death with Dignity” laws, 
which, generally speaking, allow a person to permit physicians to prescribe lethal 
medications to him or her, such that the person controls the decision to end his or her own 
life.180 Dignity also pervades the legal concept of informed consent, wherein a person is 
                                                
176 Oberg v. Billings, 207 Mont. 277, 285 (Mont. 1983). 
177 Id.  
178 Id. 
179 See Criminal Justice, New Technologies, and the Constitution, U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT, 9 (May 1988) (“Emerging technologies based on molecular biology may reveal some of the 
causes of violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior. They could also be used to manipulate or control 
behavior, and this would risk violations of individual autonomy.”).  
180 See, e.g., Oregon Death with Dignity Act, ORS § 127.800 et seq. For an overview of Death with Dignity 
legislation, see Mike DeBonis, Death With Dignity’ laws are proposed, bringing national debate to D.C. 
and Md., WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/death-with-
dignity-laws-are-proposed-bringing-national-debate-to-dc-and-md/2015/01/16/8354bba8-9d09-11e4-a7ee-
526210d665b4_story.html. 
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entitled to all relevant information that could influence his or her decision to agree to 
something.181  
d. Dignity and Privacy: Similar, But Not the Same  
 The above sections have endeavored to explain how liberty, privacy, and dignity 
are conceptualized, and how each appears in American law. To review, liberty can be 
seen as autonomy in action; privacy, as a protective condition conducive to the exercise 
of autonomy; and dignity as autonomy itself, in terms of being both (a) a byproduct of 
peoples’ rationality (mandating a threshold level of respect due each person) and (b) a 
status achieved through the exercise of rationality to make autonomous choices 
(mandating non-interference with peoples’ decision-making processes).  
 In concluding this section, two further points are necessary, which are important 
to the later analysis of data breach harms. First, every violation of privacy is also an 
invasion of a person’s autonomy, but the converse is not true. Second, compared to 
liberty and privacy, dignitary harms are more difficult to identify. Each of these points 
causes privacy harms to be more easily recognized than dignitary harms.  
i. Dignity Harms Are The Least Observable  
 Liberty and privacy violations are easily observable. The freedom to do some 
thing or act in a certain way, when restricted, is visible. To take a well-known example, 
the freedom to “bear arms” when circumscribed, or denied outright, is fairly obvious: the 
                                                
181 Dworkin, supra note 40, at 5 (“All discussions of the nature of informed consent and its rationale refer 
to patient (or subject) autonomy. Conflicts between autonomy and paternalism occur in cases involving 
civil commitment, lying to patients, refusals of life-saving treatment, suicide intervention, and patient 
care.”). 
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person is no longer (legally) able to carry a certain firearm in a certain location182 or to 
carry one at all.183 Privacy invasions, while more abstract, are also relatively easy to 
perceive. When a person invades another’s home, the homeowner’s spatial seclusion is 
trespassed.184 When a person discloses some information about another the latter desired 
to keep secret, that person has exposed that person against his or her wishes.185 These 
characteristics of liberty and privacy make them easily protectable in law. 
 Violations of dignity (or “indignities”) are comparatively opaque. Unlike liberty, 
person A can violate person B’s dignity without restraining some action or conduct of 
B’s.186 Similarly, person A can violate person B’s dignity without harming their 
privacy.187 Because indignities often involve coercion, deception, or manipulation – none 
of which are necessarily physical or spatial – indignities can be comparatively more 
difficult to identify.   
 
                                                
182 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. 641.165 (forbidding the carrying of a firearm in any jail, lockup, or correctional 
facility).  
183 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. 609.67 (restricting the right to own certain types of assault weapons and shotguns).  
184 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413 (U.S. 1967) (“[t]his Court held that the doctrines of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of 
the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”).  
185 Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000-VCP 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, at *22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 
2011) (“California common law recognizes the tort of public disclosure, one of four distinct torts that fall 
within the collective rubric of invasion of privacy. This tort is distinct from a suit for libel or “false light” 
because the claimant need not challenge the accuracy of the information disclosed to the public, but rather, 
must show that the disclosure is so intimate and unwarranted as to outrage the community's notion of 
decency.”).  
186 For example, through the use of deception, which interferes with a person’s decision-making process but 
does not necessarily restrain their action in anyway.  
187 For example, through the use of coercion, deception, or manipulation, one can hinder a person’s 
autonomy that in no way affects that person’s privacy.  
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ii. Every Privacy Invasion Violates Autonomy  
 As noted above, privacy is a seen as related to autonomy in the sense that, without 
privacy, one can be frustrated in his or her ability to live his or her life free from undue 
external influences – in short, to live autonomously. Because of this relationship, wherein 
“privacy is constitutive of autonomy,”188 every violation of privacy is a therefore a 
violation of autonomy. If one’s control of oneself is invaded, either in a spatial or 
intellectual sense, he or she is less able to determine his or her best path free from an 
unwanted influence.  
 It is worth noting that philosophy and law diverge on this point. Dworkin, for 
example, would disagree with the notion that every privacy violation also violates one’s 
autonomy. Dworkin proffers the example of wiretapping or eavesdropping: “[i]f someone 
taps your phone conversations without your knowledge he interferes with your privacy. 
But your decisions, your actions, your values, are in no way changed or altered from what 
they might be otherwise. You are as self-determining as ever.”189 At a conceptual level, it 
may be true to say privacy has been invaded in this situation. Legally, however, this is 
not the case, because one must be aware of the surveillance in order for the invasion to 
occur.190 Of course, as a matter of pure logic, in order to bring a complaint, a person who 
                                                
188 Nissenbaum, supra note 122, at 81 (describing the view that “privacy is, in fact, partially constitutive of 
autonomy . . . privacy is to be understood as a form of autonomy, [as] self-determination with respect to 
information about oneself.”). 
189 Dworkin, supra note 40, at 104.  
190 See Gavison, supra note 115, at 457 (“It is . . . difficult to know when one’s communications have been 
intercepted, when one is being observed or followed, or when others are reading one’s dossier. This 
absence of awareness is a serious problem in a legal system that relies primarily on complaints initiated by 
victims.”).   
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feels that his or her privacy was invaded must be aware of the invasion. But this 
understanding of privacy has also been codified and is well understood in privacy law. 
The Privacy Act of 1974,191 for instance, prohibits the government from sharing 
information about citizens, but it requires that a third party actually view the information 
in order to trigger rights of the subject to sue.192 And courts generally hold that privacy 
invasions require actual viewership of the information one seeks to protect.193  
 These points are raised because they point to a reality that is relevant in the data 
breach context: invasions or violations of privacy are more visible harms than affronts to 
dignity. The trappings of privacy law that make privacy harm easy to observe – such as 








                                                
191 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
192 5 C.F.R. § 297.102 (Under the Privacy Act, “[d]isclosure means providing personal review of a record, 
or a copy thereof, to someone other than the data subject or the data subject’s authorized representative, 
parent, or legal guardian.”) (emphasis added).  
193 In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 
2014) (“For a person's privacy to be invaded, their personal information must, at a minimum, be disclosed 
to a third party. Existing case law and legislation support that common-sense intuition: If no one has 
viewed your private information (or is about to view it imminently), then your privacy has not been 
violated.”). 
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FIGURE 1  
 
e. Summary 
 In concluding, this Part seeks to demonstrate that liberty, dignity, and privacy are 
three values or normative goals in American law that protect and nurture autonomy. 
Liberty is explicitly stated as a normative value in the Constitution. Privacy has also been 
established as a fundamental right through the Supreme Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence and the development of the Invasion of Privacy tort. Lastly, dignity has 
                                                
194 Dworkin, supra note 40, at 105.  
195 Gavison, supra note 115, at 438. 
196 Castiglione, supra note 150, at 688-89. 




Unique from 1 
 
 
Unique from 2 
 















Requires restraint of 










Does not require 
restraint of some 
human action.  
  
Privacy elements are 









treating a person as 
an end, not a 
means;196 






Does not require 








  44 
also been recognized as a fundamental value and as protective of autonomy. Unlike 
liberty, however, it is not concerned with the ability of a person to take some action. In 
addition, the familiar trappings of privacy, as laid out in the invasion of privacy tort – 
secrecy, anonymity, and spatial seclusion – are absent.  
 In the following Part, this thesis argues that data breaches vividly expose this 
dynamic. Having one’s PII made vulnerable (but not used) does not keep one from doing 
something he or she would otherwise do. It is not accurate to say a person’s liberty has 
been robbed. In addition, privacy is not usually a contestable legal issue because 
viewership of the data is often difficult, if not impossible to prove. But dignity, as has 
been shown, does not require the restraint of action nor the distinct privacy 
characteristics. Data breaches are unique in causing a dignitary harm which, as explained 
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PART II 
III. ANALYSIS: DATA BREACH HARM  
 This thesis now seeks to apply this understanding of autonomy to the data breach 
context, returning to answer the Research Questions: What is the harm that occurs to 
individuals where their data has been made vulnerable because of a breach, but who have 
not become victims of identity theft? What is the nature of that harm? Secondly, does this 
harm merit legal redress? In answering these questions, this Part dissects each sequence 
of events that compose a data breach: (1) the disclosure of the PII; (2) the security or 
insecurity of the PII; and (3) the breach itself.  
a. The Disclosure of PII 
 A data breach can’t happen without data, and cyber thieves wouldn’t bother with 
hacking were it not for the value of the information. The first meaningful element of a 
data breach is disclosure of individuals’ PII. Is this release of PII harmful in and of itself? 
This section argues that consent to the release of PII is dubious where it is coerced by 
practical necessity. However, while consent is important, non-consent is normally not 
grounds for legal redress in and of itself; instead, non-consent is dependent on some later 
harm to occur. 
i. Consent and Coercion  
 The release of PII is, at least in a basic sense, completely free and voluntary. 
Indeed, release of PII is an almost mundane part of everyday life – and some individuals 
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eagerly release PII in return for whatever benefit might attach.198 The Information Age is, 
after all, fuelled by the benefits it provides to both company and consumer. The 
collection, aggregation, and analysis of individuals’ personal information allow 
companies to direct their marketing to specific demographics and target audiences, 
thereby increasing revenue.199 But it also provides better services to the individual 
customer, creating consumer preference and loyalty.200 
 Yet, although individuals may agree to disclose their PII, two prerequisites of 
autonomy, discussed above, come into play: freedom from coercion and quality of 
choice. Are people actually acting autonomously when the choices they make occur in an 
environment with few or no practical alternatives? Consent implies the possibility of 
refusal,201 and refusal to release PII today, while technically possible, would leave 
                                                
198 A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1502 (2000) (“[E]ven Americans 
who place a high value on information privacy will sell their privacy bit by bit for frequent flyer miles.”). 
See also Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1916 (2012). Donald Michael noted 
as early as 1963 that individuals would likely desire “central data files” so that they can “acquire quickly 
those conveniences that flow from a reliable credit rating and an acceptable social character” and that “we 
can expect a great deal of information about the social, personal, and economic characteristics of 
individuals to be supplied voluntarily – often eagerly.” See Westin, supra note 1, at 313 (quoting Donald 
Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom and the Right to Privacy, 
GEO. WASH. 33 L. REV. 275 (1964)). 
199 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403-09 (2001) (discussing the rise of individualized marketing).  
200 See Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of Privacy and 
the Benefits of Information Exchange 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 39, 46, 48 (2000) (“Having some 
information about ourself out there in the world offers real convenience that goes beyond dollars and cents. 
Many people benefit from warehousing information - billing and shipping addresses, credit card numbers, 
individual preferences, and the like - with third parties. Such storage of information can dramatically 
simplify the purchasing experience…”).  
201 Edward Jange & Paul Schwartz, Notice, Autonomy, and Enforcement of Data Privacy Legislation: The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 
1248 (2002).  
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individuals in an untenable position, without a bank account or the use of modern forms 
of payment like credit cards, for example.  
 The current environment, in which merchants, banks, Internet providers, 
constantly collect personal information, also limits the quality of choice.202 Professor 
Paul Schwartz presciently explained, more than a decade ago, how the Information Age 
architecture can impede meaningful consent to the release of PII. Schwartz noted how the 
“liberal ideal” perspective assumed that individuals could protect their privacy (and thus 
autonomy) by controlling access to their personal information.203 The reality, Schwartz 
was beginning to see, was that a power imbalance between the individual and the entities 
who collected the information produced an environment in which individuals had little 
choice but to reveal certain information to private actors.204 The ability to keep data 
secure to oneself, Schwartz noted, “quickly proves illusory because of the demands of the 
Information Age.”205 
 Schwartz illustrated this point by outlining four problems with meaningful control 
of PII. First, the “knowledge gap”: a “widespread ignorance regarding the terms that 
regulate disclosure or nondisclosure of personal information.”206 Second, the “consent 
                                                
202 Cohen, supra note 119, at 1430 (“Certain industries do require the exchange of personally-identified 
data in order to function. Prominent examples include the credit reporting, health care and biomedical 
research, insurance and financial services, and higher education industries.”). 
203 Schwartz, supra note 79, at 1662. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 1660. 
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fallacy” which consists of “weaknesses in the nature of agreement to data use.”207 And 
third, the “autonomy trap.”208 Schwartz’ discussion of the autonomy trap is particularly 
relevant in the context of data breaches. Schwartz noted that “the organization of 
information privacy through individual control of personal data rests on a view of 
autonomy as a given, preexisting quality.”209 The problem with privacy-control in the 
Information Age, though, “is that individual self-determination is itself shaped by the 
processing of personal data.”210  
 As an example, Schwartz discussed the online “click wrap” agreement. As 
Schwartz explained, clicking through a consent page “may be considered by some 
observers to be an exercise of self-reliant choice” online.211 But the screen could (and 
often does) contain boilerplate language permitting “all further processing and 
transmission of one’s personal data.”212 Faced with a choice between consenting to the 
recipients’ desired use of their information, and being blocked from, say, using a credit 
card, individuals inevitably provide consent – but the consent reflects the power 
imbalance between the parties. In Schwartz’ example, this produces a “legal fiction that 
all who visit [a] Web site have expressed informed consent to its data processing 





211 Id. at 1661. 
212 Id. 
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practices.”213 Thus, Schwartz’ autonomy trap refers to the quality of choice and the 
implications for consent.  
 Schwartz originally wrote about individuals’ consent to data processing and use, 
but his argument easily carries over, in the data breach context, to how information is 
protected. As with the use of their PII, individuals also consent to the release of their PII 
but, currently, have little to no leverage in demanding certain levels of protection. Some 
federal statutes – notably, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPPA), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) – do require certain security standards.214 But these statutes 
operate as exceptions, instead of the rule – unless the information fits within one of the 
relatively narrow categories, no single law grants citizens the power to demand a certain 
level of protection.215 Perhaps not suprisingly, Americans seem to be losing faith in the 
degree to which their information actually is adequately protected. A recent Pew survey, 
for example, found that “[a]cross the board, there is a universal lack of confidence among 
adults in the security of everyday communications channels—particularly when it comes 
to the use of online tools.”216 
                                                
213 Id. 
214 See 45 CFR parts 160, 162, and 164 (security rule relating to HIPPA); 16 CFR Part 314 (“Safeguards 
Rule” applying to Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act); 44 U.S.C. § 3542 (requiring federal agencies to develop and 
implement security programs for the protection of data). 
215 Although some federal laws do mandate “reasonable” levels of security, enforceable by the FCC (see 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 222) and FTC (15 U.S.C. § 45). The FTC’s action in this realm is 
discussed below.  
216 Mary Madden, Public Perception of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/. 
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ii. Should Law Respond? 
 Because individuals face unattractive choices if they opt never to share their PII, 
their ultimate choice to do so is, at least in a small degree, coerced. Although they make 
the choice voluntarily (and thereby exercise liberty), the reality that they practically must 
make the choice to enjoy fundamental benefits, and that the alternatives to disclosure are 
undesirable, both work together to dilute the autonomy that would otherwise be 
exercised. In this way, the choice is coerced.  
 But coercion does not automatically require a legal response. Coercion “exists on 
a spectrum.”217 At one end, extreme and physical coercion, such as torture or rape, is 
widely condemned.218 The law also acts to prevent subtler, psychological forms of 
coercion, as well – for instance, through laws criminalizing blackmail and extortion.219 
With torture, the act itself constitutes battery, a physical harm illegal in and of itself. With 
blackmail, the act itself – revealing information – is usually legal in and of itself, but the 
effect of the blackmailer’s threat is deemed to be harmful and worthy of punishment 
because it forces – it coerces – the victim into a position in which he or she is likely to do 
                                                
217 Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L. J. 1131, 1150 (2011). 
218 David Sussman, What’s Wrong With Torture? 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2005) (“Since at least Beccaria 
there has been a broad and confident consensus that torture is uniquely barbaric and inhuman: the most 
profound violation possible of the dignity of a human being.”) (internal quotations omitted); Ivanna 
Radacic, Does International Human Rights Law Adequately Protect the Dignity of Women? in Humiliation, 
DEGRADATION, DEHUMANIZATION: HUMAN DIGNITY VIOLATED 119 (Springer, 2011) (“rape has long been 
thought of as a prime example of a violation of human dignity”). 
219 See, e.g., 18 U.S. Code § 873 (criminalizing blackmail) (“Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a 
consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands or receives 
any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or 
both.”).  
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something independently illegal (for instance, steal from a third party), and thus harm 
society.220  
 The transfer of PII does not share these traits. The disclosure is neither a physical 
wrong in itself nor does it coerce the “victim” to do something society discourages. In 
fact, society is dependent upon and even encourages individuals to feel comfortable 
disclosing their PII, for a variety of beneficial purposes such as increased ease of 
commercial transactions or simple convenience. Relatedly, what coercion does exist is 
relatively slight and perhaps even unnoticed by most Americans.221  
 Instead, what we associate negatively with this particular type of coercion is the 
attendant reality that the PII-recipient then does not protect peoples’ PII as well as it 
could, thereby putting people in the path to future harm. Although that harm is real, the 
disclosure of PII is not harmful in itself because it (at least typically) neither involves 
physical coercion nor does the act coerce people to do something independently harmful. 
This counsels toward legal regulation of the degree to which information is protected – 
but not toward regulation to limit disclosure.  
b. The (In)security of the PII 
 The second meaningful event in the timeline of a data breach is the storage of the 
PII by its recipient. The storage places the PII in a fixed state such that it is capable of 
being acquired by the third party hacker. The issue here is not the storage per se, but how 
                                                
220 See Henry E. Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 868 (1998).  
221 Madden, supra note 216 (“In the commercial context, consumers are skeptical about some of the 
benefits of personal data sharing, but are willing to make tradeoffs in certain circumstances when their 
sharing of information provides access to free services.”) 
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the recipient protects the information from third parties whom the individual did not 
intend to share the PII with. Does failing to uphold a certain level of security inflict harm 
on the individual who disclosed his or her PII? 
i. Harm Requires Awareness  
 Solove argues that insecurity, or “carelessness in protecting stored information,” 
does constitute an injury and describes it as “being placed in a weakened state, of being 
made more vulnerable to a range of future harms.”222 However, if and until a person is 
aware of the insecurity of their PII, no harm has occurred. Data insecurity may lay the 
groundwork for future harm in the form of the breach itself, but until an individual is 
aware of his vulnerability – or if he is lied to about the security of the data223 – he has not 
been harmed. 
 The classic case DeMay v. Roberts serves as an example.224 There, a man falsely 
presented himself as a physician while a woman gave birth. The plaintiff sued, claiming 
an invasion of privacy, but only after she discovered his actual identity.225 Had she never 
learned of his identity, her sense of being violated – her harm – would have never 
accrued.226 Similarly, the tort of assault exemplifies the same concern for harm only 
                                                
222 Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 518 (2006). 
223 This would implicate deception, which reduces autonomy. This point is discussed in the context of FTC 
Section 5 actions, infra, in Part III.  
224 DeMay v Roberts, 46 Mich. 160 (1881). 
225 Id. at 161. 
226 Ryan Calo articulates this point in his discussion of subjective privacy harms, noting that the harmful 
feeling of unwanted observation can occur in one brief moment, can linger, or can even be delayed. Calo, 
supra note 217, at 1145. 
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where the victims is aware of it, as assault requires the knowledge of the offensive action; 
a person getting ready to strike another cannot be liable for assault if the person cannot 
see his attacker.227  
 So too is the situation in the data breach context. Lax security standards present a 
problem insofar as they make a future harm possible, but the data insecurity cannot be 
said to harm the individual unless the relevant individuals are aware of the insecurity, or 
the lack of security has been misrepresented. As explained above, deception reduces 
autonomy in the sense that it interferes with an individual’s decision-making and self-
determination. This violation of autonomy is recognized in law as harmful. Again, the 
DeMay v. Roberts case is illustrative. The plaintiff brought an invasion of privacy claim 
and, because the defendant invaded her personal space and saw her giving birth – a sight 
she sought to protect – the defendant did, in fact, invade her privacy.228 As the court 
recognized, though, the wrong stemmed from the defendant’s deceit in failing to disclose 
that he was neither medically trained nor the doctor’s aide, but merely a layman.229 This 
deceit impaired the plaintiff’s decision-making and consent to his presence in the room.  
ii. Should Law Respond? 
                                                
227 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21 Assault, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (requiring “imminent 
apprehension” of “harmful or offensive contact.”).  
228 Today, the plaintiff would have likely prevailed with the intrusion upon seclusion tort.  
229 See DeMay at 166. (“In obtaining admission at such a time and under such circumstances without fully 
disclosing his true character, [the doctor and the defendant] were guilty of deceit, and the wrong thus done 
entitles the injured party to recover the damages afterwards sustained, from shame and mortification upon 
discovering the true character of the defendants.”) (emphasis added). 
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 Though inadequate security does not, in and of itself, harm individuals, both law 
and private sector standards and regulations recognize the harm that it invites. In this 
sense, the law already does respond to the problem of inadequate security.  
 Some federal statutes, as noted above, do require certain entities to implement 
security programs for the protection of PII.230 Even where the law does not formally 
require a particular level of security, however, certain private sector standards and rules 
come into play. Recognizing the potential harm to its reputation (and bottom line), certain 
industry groups impose security standards upon their members.231 And when a company 
does decide to publish how it protects PII through its data security or privacy policy, the 
FTC can and does hold those companies to their word through the use of its Section 5 
authority to police “deceptive” practices.232 
 Companies are not required to implement privacy policies, nor is adherence to 
industry guidelines legally required per se. Perhaps this reflects the reality that harms to 
individuals do not accrue through poor security standards until a breach actually occurs. 
Nonetheless, recognizing the prospect of future harm, some industry standards do protect 
against insecure storage of PII.  
c. The Data Breach  
 The third important juncture in a data breach is the breach itself, including the 
period between the breach and any ultimate resolution to the breach. When a third party 
                                                
230 See supra note 214.  
231 For instance, the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council imposes “Data Security Standards” 
on vendors who use credit and debit cards. See PCI Security Standards Council Releases Version 1.2 of 
PCI Data Security, Security Standards Council (Oct. 1 2008).  
232 This is discussed more infra, in Part III.  
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pierces a security system, this surely violates law in that the third party was not granted 
access to the information. But what harm has occurred to the individual whose PII is now 
under the control of the third party, and not solely the intended recipient? Does the 
individual suffer any harm when her PII has not actually been used to commit fraud? This 
section argues that such a harm manifests in an individuals’ loss of autonomy, 
specifically through the loss of knowledge regarding the choices available to him or 
herself. This loss of negative freedom inhibits the individual’s actions such to the extent 
that a concrete harm has occurred.  
i. Vulnerability: The Loss of Negative Freedom  
 At the point of data breach, courts and commentators alike focus on the risk of 
future harm through identity theft and fraud, as though the risk itself encapsulated the 
harm. To be sure, this potential occurrence would certainly be harmful. The actual misuse 
of the information reduces freedom, or liberty itself, in its raw form: identity theft and 
fraud literally restricts a person from spending money he or she otherwise would be able 
to. Not surprisingly, this harm, in the form of a loss of liberty, is easily recognizable and 
criminalized.233  
 In addition, though, another harm exists regardless of whether the overt harm of 
identity theft ever occurs:234 a lack of knowledge about freedom. At the point of data 
breach, the individual knows that his information could be used without her consent to 
                                                
233 See supra, Part II.  
234 Often, breaches expose information without any resulting identity theft. See Data Breaches Are 
Frequent, But Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft is Limited; However, the Full Extent is Unknown, U.S. 
GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Report (2007) (noting that “available data and interviews with 
researchers, law enforcement officials, and industry representatives indicated that most breaches have not 
resulted in detected incidents of identity theft”).  
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commit fraud or another crime. This knowledge arrests the victims’ rational decision-
making because she cannot be sure what the criminal may or may not do with his or her 
information. Professor Boudewijn de Bruin offers an example of this process in 
information security context:  
disclosure of private information may harm the subject [in] that it 
decreases her known freedom: the person’s beliefs about her freedom and 
unfreedom deteriorate. What is important now is that the inadequacy of 
these beliefs is far from hypothetical. They are faulty, not in a hypothetical 
future, but at the very moment of the data breach, and a direct 
consequence of that is that the person’s present decision-making capacities 
are frustrated. She is less well positioned than she was before the data 
breach to engage in responsible planning and decision making, because 
she will have to incorporate, in her current planning, the fact that her 
beliefs about certain freedoms and unfreedoms are less adequate than 
before the breach.235 
 
 This lack of known freedom manifests in a feeling of vulnerability, anxiety, and 
fear, placing the individual in a weaker state than before. As Solove explains, “[t]he 
potential for secondary use generates fear and uncertainty over how one’s information 
will be used in the future, creating a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability.”236 
 This feeling of powerlessness and vulnerability constitutes harm in itself. Further, 
it can cause individuals to act in ways they would not have otherwise. In the wake of a 
data breach, for instance, individuals might purchase identity theft insurance, or begin a 
                                                
235 Boudewijn de Bruin, The Liberal Value of Privacy, 29.5 LAW AND PHIL., 505, 532-33 (2010). De Bruin 
offers another example of how data disclosure can cause a loss of knowledge about one’s freedom in the 
release of travel itineraries to a third party, such as an airline carrier: “Not knowing much about the criteria 
that underlie no-fly lists, but knowing that my travel itineraries may be thought of as ‘suspicious,’ I do not 
know for sure that I will be barred from flying. But neither am I sure that I will not, so I have to suspend 
my initial belief that I can fly to London. This constitutes a genuine reduction of known freedom.” Id. at 
529. 
236 Solove, supra note 222 at 520.  
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process of identity reclamation with the government.237 Such physical acts incur financial 
costs, and the law currently already recognizes this financial burden as a cognizable 
harm. The question is then: should the law wait to act until a financial injury accrues? 
ii. Should Law Respond? 
 A person’s autonomy is violated in everyday life by seemingly innocuous 
events.238 A white lie, for instance, can be considered a violation of the listener’s 
autonomy, yet the law does not respond. Why should law respond to the loss of 
autonomy that results from a data breach?239 The harm merits redress for two reasons: the 
harm is widely and similarly felt, and failure to respond could cause Americans to 
become more hesitant to share data, which would frustrate stated policy goals.  
 As has been discussed, democracies generally seek to protect and further their 
citizens’ autonomy.240 At a fundamental level, each person deserves to be treated with 
dignity: free from undue manipulation and coercion, and “as an end and not a means” 
generally. This maxim can translate in the Information Age to a mandate that consumers 
                                                
237 Id. at 509-10 (2010) (Explaining how the theft of a bank server can induce individuals to purchase 
identity theft insurance: “I do not know whether the burglar wanted to get the computer hardware or the 
financial records stored on it, and hence my knowledge about future interference is reduced. I am less sure 
than I was prior to the burglary about, say, the chance that criminals will try to obtain credit in my name, 
constituting a decrease of knowledge about negative freedom that may find reflection in the fact that I 
decide to buy insurance against identity theft.”).  
238 Complete autonomy, like total privacy, “does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who 
is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.” 
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 37 (Cal. 1994) (citing Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 652D, 
com. c.). 
239 Solove, supra note 222, at 484 (“Declaring that an activity is harmful or problematic does not 
automatically imply that there should be legal redress, since there may be valid reasons why the law should 
not get involved or why countervailing interests should prevail.”).  
240 See supra Part I.  
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not be “used” for their PII241 without a concomitant duty to protect that PII from future 
misuse and harm. This reflects a threshold level of respect for the consumer and the 
harms they may feel, such as vulnerability, anxiety, and nervousness, discussed above, if 
their PII becomes vulnerable in the wake of a breach.  
 What makes legal action more compelling, however, is the fact that the harm is so 
widely felt. Unlike minor infringements of autonomy that occur in day to day interactions 
with fellow citizens, data breaches cause harms that affect literally millions of people.242 
Not surprising given the increased prevalence of data breaches, more Americans are 
reporting themselves as victims of breaches.243 Unlike losses of autonomy occurring in 
everyday private interactions, data breaches cause uniform, widely felt harms, ripe for 
government redress.  
 In addition, scholars and politicians alike understand the consequences of 
dignitary harms in the data security context – the feelings of insecurity and vulnerability 
can result in distrust of the companies who store Americans’ information. As the White 
House recently noted in support of cybersecurity legislation: “As cybersecurity threats 
                                                
241 Especially within the data trade and behavioral advertising contexts, it is not unfair to view consumers 
as being “used” for their PII. See Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and 
Tagging of Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 556-557 (2008) (noting 
companies’ practice of collecting PII “and stor[ing] it in sophisticated databases where it can: (1) fulfill a 
transaction; (2) supplement an internal marketing profile; (3) be mined to predict future purchases; and (4) 
be sold to unrelated third parties for a profit.”).  
242 See supra Introduction.  
243 Mary Madden, More Online Americans Say They’ve Experienced a Data Breach, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Apr. 14, 2014) (reporting on a survey which suggested “growing numbers of online Americans 
have had important personal information stolen and many have had an account compromised. Findings 
from a January 2014 survey show that: 18% of online adults have had important personal information 
stolen such as their Social Security Number, credit card, or bank account information. That’s an increase 
from the 11% who reported personal information theft in July 2013.”).  
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and identity theft continue to rise, recent polls show that nine in 10 Americans feel they 
have in some way lost control of their personal information — and that can lead to less 
interaction with technology, less innovation and a less productive economy.”244 Although 
few doubt the endurance and vitality of the Information Age, the continued spate of data 
breaches surely does not alleviate any reticence or chilling effects individuals may feel 
about sharing information online.245   
d. Liberty and Privacy 
 Data breaches withhold knowledge of who is in possession of an individuals’ PII, 
and how the unknown party may use it. This loss of knowledge about one’s freedom 
arrests decision-making, interfering with one’s exercise of autonomy and producing 
feelings of anxiety and distress. Because important information is withheld, individuals’ 
suffer a loss of autonomy. This loss is most akin to an indignity.  
 Victims’ privacy and liberty, in contrast, remain intact. First, where victims’ PII 
has not been used to commit identity theft and fraudulent purchases, their actions have 
not been restrained. If the Target hacker had used Mike and Hallie’s credit card 
                                                
244 See Michael Shear and Natasha Singer, Obama to Call for Laws Covering Data Hacking and Student 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/us/politics/obama-to-call-for-
laws-covering-data-hacking-and-student-privacy.html?ref=politics. A recent report of medical data 
breaches found that “a majority of patients (54 percent) are “moderately” or “very likely” to change doctors 
as a result of a patient data breach” and that “early one-quarter of patients (21 percent) withhold personal 
health information from their doctors due to data security concerns.” Gaby Loria, Software Advice Report: 
HIPPA Breaches: Minimizing Risks and Patient Fears, SOFTWARE ADVICE (2015), available at 
http://www.softwareadvice.com/medical/industryview/hipaa-breaches-report-2015/. 
245 See, e.g., Hearing on Data Security Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong., 1 (2011) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Dir. of the 
Bureau of Consumer Prot. at the Fed. Trade Comm’n) (“Data security is of critical importance to 
consumers. If companies do not protect the personal information they collect and store, that information 
could fall into the wrong hands, resulting in fraud and other harm, and consumers could lose confidence in 
the marketplace.”). 
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information to rack up fraudulent purchases on their account, then Mike and Hallie’s 
liberty would be restrained, at least conceptually, because they would no longer be free to 
rely on credit that was otherwise available. But until their PII is used, the main harm 
Mike and Hallie suffer is a subjective one – a dignitary harm – stemming from the 
uncertainty as to what may eventually happen.  
 Privacy, as opposed to liberty, is a more popular interest invoked in this context. 
Individual victims whose PII has been made vulnerable, but not misused, commonly 
invoke state common law invasion of privacy claims when suing in court.246 Because 
privacy is often conceptualized in terms of the degree to which one controls information 
about him or herself, it seems intuitive that privacy is invaded where one’s PII becomes 
vulnerable due to a breach – the victim no longer is in control of who may view (or, 
worse) use the PII. Yet, in many data breaches, whether the hacker has actually viewed 
the PII is unclear (and perhaps un-provable). Many data breaches do not result in identity 
theft.247 And until the hacker actually uses the PII to commit a further crime, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to show that any third party actually viewed the PII.  
                                                
246 See Paul Karlsgodt, Key Issues in Consumer Data Breach Litigation, PRACTICE LAW: THE JOURNAL, 51 
(2014), available at https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/News/Articles/LITIGATION/2014/Karlsgodt-
Lit_OctNov14_DataBreachFeature.pdf; Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman, Alessandro Acquisti, 
Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11.1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDIES, 25 (Finding only state 
unfair business practices act and Fair Credit Reporting Act claims being brought more than Privacy Act and 
Privacy Tort claims). See also Cease, supra note 32 at 405 (“Oftentimes, the plaintiff will also allege that 
the defendant violated state consumer protection laws, breached some fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff, 
or infringed on some state constitutional or statutory guarantee of the right to privacy.”).  
247 See supra, note 233.  
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 This was very recently on display in Storm v. Paytime, Inc.248 In that case, a 
consolidation of two class actions, the defendant computer company suffered a data 
breach at the hand of unknown hackers, gaining access to over 230,000 peoples’ PII.249 
The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that they had suffered a “harm to their privacy 
interest.”250 But the court was skeptical. “For a person’s privacy to be invaded, their 
personal information must, at a minimum, be disclosed to a third party . . . if no one has 
viewed your private information (or is about to view it imminently), then your privacy 
has not been violated.”251 Because the Plaintiffs could not show that the hacker was 
actually able to “view, read, or otherwise understand the data it accessed” the Court held 
that they had not alleged a privacy harm.252 Despite some courts’ feeling that a PII 
recipient has wronged the individual then, courts simply cannot let a suit succeed on an 
invasion of privacy claim.253  
 
 
                                                
248 No: 14-cv-1138, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31286 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015). 
249 Id. at *23.  
250 Id.  
251 Id.  
252 Id.  
253 See, e.g, Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 710 (D.C. 2009) (“In this age of 
identity theft and other wrongful conduct through the unauthorized use of electronically-stored data, we 
have little difficulty agreeing that conduct giving rise to unauthorized viewing of personal information such 
as a plaintiff’s Social Security number and other identifying information can constitute an intrusion that is 
highly offensive to any reasonable person, and may support an action for invasion of privacy (irrespective 
of whether the plaintiff alleges that economic or other resultant injuries have already come to pass). We 
nonetheless affirm the dismissal of appellants’ invasion-of-privacy count, because the amended complaint 
fails to allege all of the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy.”).  
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e. Summary 
 This Part has attempted to show that individuals do suffer a loss of autonomy as a 
result of a data breach. Victims like Mike and Hallie feel a sense of vulnerability, 
stemming from their inability to determine exactly how their PII may be used at some 
future time by an unknown hacker. This insecurity can best be described as a loss of 
negative freedom. This is not a privacy or liberty harm, because victims’ actions are not 
restrained, nor are they sure their PII has been viewed, which would arguably violate 
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PART III 
IV. PRACTICAL UTILITY: WHY IDENTIFYING THE HARM MATTERS 
 Part I explained the concept of autonomy, and Part II discussed how data breaches 
can violate dignity, constituting a harm worthy of legal redress. Part III argues that the 
FTC is uniquely positioned to respond to this harm. To maintain its jurisdiction to do so, 
however, the FTC should recognize the harm it redresses as one to consumers’ dignity, 
and not to their privacy.  
a. The FTC’s Section 5 Authority  
 
 Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.254 As conceived, the 
FTC was intended to recapture legislative control of antitrust from the judiciary,255 but in 
1938 Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment,256 which broadened the FTC’s 
authority to police companies’ “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” on behalf of 
consumers. The Bureau of Consumer Protection currently brings actions against private 
entities it has reason to believe violate Section 5. 
 Deceptive practices are defined as “material representation[s], omission[s] or 
practice[s] that [are] likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”257 Actions in which the FTC challenges a 
company’s practice as deceptive are relatively straightforward in the data security 
                                                
254 15 U.S.C §§ 41-58.  
255 See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 233 (1980) (“The initial task for the legislature was to recover the 
power to control antitrust policies.”) 
256 Pub. L. No. 75-447,52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)). 
257 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  
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context: a company promised it would protect consumers’ PII in a certain way, and then 
failed to do so. By breaking its promise, the company deceived the consumer.258 The FTC 
has successfully brought actions against companies that state in their privacy or security 
policies that they protect or use their customers’ information in one way, but then diverge 
from that promised path.259  
 “Unfair,” however, is notoriously broad.260 At the time of Wheeler-Lea’s passage, 
Congress declined to narrow its scope, purposefully maintaining vagueness so the FTC 
could respond to future as yet unanticipated acts.261 In 1980, the FTC released a policy 
statement in which it attempted to “delineate . . . a concrete framework for future 
application of the Commission’s unfairness authority.”262 The statement began by noting 
that “unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act.”263 The 
                                                
258 See Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Litigation: Has the 
Commission Gone Too Far? 60 ADMIN L. REV. 127, 132 (2008).  
259 See, e.g., Complaint at 8-9, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc. (FTC Dec. 31, 2014), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatcmpt.pdf (“Snapchat has represented, 
expressly or by implication, that it employs reasonable security measures to protect personal information 
from misuse and unauthorized disclosure. In truth and in fact . . . in many instances, Snapchat did not 
employ reasonable security measures to protect personal information from misuse and unauthorized 
disclosure. Therefore, the representation . . . is false or misleading. The acts and practices of respondent as 
alleged in this complaint constitute deceptive acts or practices . . . in violation of Section 5(a) . . .”).  
260 Not long after the FTC Act’s passing, the Supreme Court recognized that “unfairness” “belongs to that 
class of phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be 
arrived at by . . . the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.” FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 
643, 648 (1931) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
261 See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, FED. TRADE COMM. (Dec. 17 1980), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness. (“The statute was 
deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list 
of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion. The 
task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, subject to judicial 
review, in the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time.”). 
262 Id. 
263 Id.  
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Commission decided that any harm must be “substantial” and not “trivial or merely 
speculative.”264 An injury can be sufficiently substantial, though, “if it does a small harm 
to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”265 “In most 
cases,” the FTC explained, “a substantial injury involves monetary harm.”266 “Emotional 
impact and other more subjective types of harm, on the other hand, will not ordinarily 
make a practice unfair.”267 
 The FTC acknowledged that “[m]ost business practices entail a mixture of 
economic and other costs and benefits for purchasers.”268 Such tradeoffs, the Commission 
reasoned, justified that only those practices which are “injurious in [their] net effects” 
warranted action.269 Thus, the FTC’s second consideration was that “the injury must not 
be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practice 
also produces.”270 
                                                
264 Id. 
265 Id. The FTC is required to show only that a companies’ practices “cause or are likely to cause” injury to 
any class of consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).  
266 As when “sellers coerce consumers into purchasing unwanted goods or services or when consumers buy 
defective goods or services on credit but are unable to assert against the creditor claims or defenses arising 
from the transaction.” FTC Policy Statement, supra note 259. The FTC does not always require monetary 
harm, though. See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“harm need not be 
monetary to qualify as an injury”) (citing  
267 Id.  
268 Id. For example, “[a] seller’s failure to present complex technical data on his product may lessen a 
consumer's ability to choose . . . but may also reduce the initial price he must pay for the article.” Id.  
269 Id.  
270 Id.  
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 Lastly, the FTC explained, “the injury must be one which consumers could not 
reasonably have avoided.”271 Consumers could be expected in most circumstances, “to 
make their own private purchasing decisions without regulatory intervention.”272 But “it 
has long been recognized that certain types of sales techniques may prevent consumers 
from effectively making their own decisions, and that corrective action may then become 
necessary.”273 Most unfairness actions are brought under this rubric; “not to second-guess 
the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller 
behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise 
of consumer decision making.”274 
 Congress codified the Policy Statement in 1994,275 and specified that a practice 
may be deemed unfair only if it “[1] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is [2] not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”276 That three-part 
cost benefit test “is the most precise definition of unfairness articulated by either the 
Commission or Congress.”277 
                                                
271 Id.  
272 Id.  
273 Id.  
274 Id.  
275 See H.R. Rep. 103-617, 12 (1994). 
276 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
277 Brief for the Fed. Trade Comm. at 2, Fed. Trade Comm. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, LLC, (FTC 
Dec. 2014), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141105wyndham_3cir_ftcbrief.pdf. (citing Am. Fin. 
Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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b. The FTC’s Unique Position to Respond  
 
 As this thesis has argued, people whose PII has been made vulnerable by a breach 
are harmed. To date, however, plaintiffs have largely been unable to find relief where the 
PII has not been used to commit identity theft. This section argues that the FTC is better 
able to respond to data breach harm for two reasons: it is not hindered by the standing 
requirement, and it can redress a small harm widely felt.  
i. The FTC Does Not Have to Show Standing  
 Data breaches cause dignity harms to the victims whose information is made 
vulnerable, manifest in feelings of anxiety, vulnerability, and distress. Yet, federal courts 
have thus far not recognized a private remedy for consumers where the PII-recipients’ 
failure to adequately protect the PII results in a breach, but the PII has not yet been 
misused, at least to the consumers’ knowledge.278 This is because the federal court’s 
standing doctrine requires plaintiffs to show that an injury that is “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical.”279 In 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court considered plaintiffs’ claims that 
the government’s surveillance program constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure 
– but they couldn’t show that their particular communications had been viewed, only that 
such surveillance was likely because of their particular actions.280 The Court held that 
                                                
278 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen, Inc., Center for Digital Democracy, and Consumer Action at 4-5 
Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham (FTC Nov. 12 2014), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/FTC-v%20-Wyndham-Third-Circuit-Amicus.pdf 
279 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (U.S. 2013). 
280 Id.  
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fear of some future harm was not sufficient, in itself, to achieve standing.281 In Clapper’s 
wake, most federal courts are holding that an increased risk of future harm – the future 
harm being identity theft – is not enough to confer standing.282  
 Data breach victims’ dignitary harms do not fit within this standing jurisprudence. 
As discussed, dignitary harms are not necessarily physical ones. Thus, unlike 
curtailments of liberty, there is no physical manifestation of the harm. Second, and more 
fundamentally, dignitary harms do not necessarily entail a loss of money. They produce 
fear, anxiety, distress – but not always any concrete financial loss. Data breach victims 
usually claim that, because they feared identity theft, they purchased identity theft 
protection or spent money in other ways to protect themselves.283 But courts simply cite 
to Clapper for the proposition that the plaintiffs cannot “manufacture” their injury in fear 
of a speculative future harm.284  
 Acting on behalf of millions of consumers nationwide, the FTC is not burdened 
by the individualized standing requirement. In passing the FTC Act, Congress 
specifically granted the Commission the authority to act on behalf of consumers as a 
whole – not as individualized parties. The FTC can bring adjudicative claims against 
companies it suspects of violating Section 5’s prohibition of “unfair or deceptive” trade 
                                                
281 Id. 
282 See supra note 31.  
283 See, e.g., Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., No. 4:14-CV-2872, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16451, at *6 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2015). 
284 Id. at 15 (citing Clapper, supra note 278).  
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practices, or it may file in federal court.285 If the party receiving the complaint disputes 
the FTC’s authority or the complaint against it, it may appeal to an adjudicatory board 
and, if it disputes that Court’s finding, may appeal to federal court.  
 Thus, as an agency instead of an individualized party, the FTC is granted the 
authority to act on behalf of the millions of people affected by data breaches through its 
administrative complaints. As such, the federal courts’ standing requirement does not 
block FTC redress. While the FTC will never be able to levy actions against every PII 
recipient with unreasonable security standards, it has enormous power even in selectively 
targeting companies that store large amounts of PII or those whose errors in data security 
were especially egregious.286 These actions are valuable insofar as they induce other 
companies to react accordingly out of fear of receiving their own FTC complaint.287    
ii. Small Harms, Widely Felt  
 Second, the FTC is equipped to respond to small harms so long as they are widely 
felt. As noted above, an injury can be sufficiently substantial under the FTC’s unfairness 
criterion “if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant 
risk of concrete harm.”288 This is especially appropriate in the data breach context where, 
                                                
285 For a summary of the FTC’s enforcement authority, see A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM. (July 2008), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority. 
286 Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC And the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 583, 607 (2014) (discussing how privacy lawyers scrutinize the FTC’s publications in its actions to 
determine how best to advise their own clients).  
287 Id. at 606.  
288 Supra note 263. The FTC is required to show only that a companies’ practices “cause or are likely to 
cause” injury to any class of consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).  
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though the harm may be slight or even barely felt by some consumers, it affects millions. 
As in a class action, then, each individual – while only suffering a small amount of harm 
individually – can still achieve redress because of the commonality and pervasiveness of 
the harm.289 Unlike a class action, plaintiffs do not receive a monetary award, but 
vindication in the form of FTC monitoring of the companies’ security programs and other 
structures designed to ensure that the failure does not recur.290  
c. The FTC’s Harm Dilemma   
 While the FTC is uniquely situated to respond to this harm, it is currently engaged 
in a challenge to its authority. Specifically, the FTC has been challenged to identify how 
allegedly “unreasonable” data security standards constitute “consumer injuries” under the 
FTC’s unfairness standards. This section argues that the FTC should frame the harm in 
the data breach context – at least where there is no identity theft – as one to victims’ 
dignity, as opposed to privacy, for two reasons, explained further below. First, 
conceptually such framing is simply more accurate. Second, in an environment in which 
the FTC’s authority is being challenged, the FTC can more credibly argue that it has 
always protected consumers’ dignity, more so than privacy. Such an argument can justify 
its actions in currently pending cases. 
 
 
                                                
289 See Thomas B. Leary, The FTC and Class Actions, FED. TRADE COMM. (June 26, 2003), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/06/ftc-and-class-actions (discussing FTC actions in 
comparison to class actions, and downsides of the latter).  
290 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 284, at 607 (discussing the usual requirements of consent decrees).  
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i. The FTC’s Data Security Actions  
 Since 2005, the FTC has levied its authority against companies for failing to 
reasonably protect consumers’ PII even where the company never proclaimed a certain 
security protection. Thus, the FTC is regulating data security through the use of its 
“unfairness” authority instead of its “deception” authority.  
 In 2005 the FTC filed an “unfairness” complaint against B&J Company when 
B&J failed to encrypt its customers’ information and use other “readily available security 
measures.”291 Hackers were able to pierce B&J’s security system and use its customers’ 
PII to rack up $13 million in fraudulent charges.292 Instead of challenging the FTC that 
“unreasonable” security standards were not “unfair,” as defined by Section 5, B&J 
settled, entering a consent decree. In the decade since, 20 companies who have received 
FTC complaints for “unfair” data security practices have ended up doing the same.293  
 However, each of these breaches resulted in identity theft and consequent 
financial loss. The FTC seemed to be limiting its authority to only those instances where 
financial harm occurred – thus, indirectly defining “unfairness” and consumer injury as 
financial loss. With this approach, the FTC would avoid responding to breaches, like 
Anthem’s in 2015, that affected massive amounts of Americans’ PII simply because no 
identity theft immediately resulted. As this thesis has sought to show, the FTC would 
                                                
291 Complaint, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (FTC Sept. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp0423160.pdf. 
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293 See Response of Fed. Trade Comm. in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint with 
Prejudice to Stay Administrative Proceedings at 9 In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., (FTC Nov. 2013), 
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therefore be failing to respond to the harm that occurs even where there is no alleged 
identity theft or financial loss.  
 Very recently, the FTC seems to have changed its approach. In 2013 the FTC 
filed an administrative complaint against LabMD, a healthcare organization, alleging that 
LabMD engaged in an “unfair” act when it allowed its patients’ PII to be available on a 
peer-to-peer file-sharing network.294 The information was later found in the possession of 
individuals who pleaded no contest to identity theft charges.295 Importantly, the FTC did 
not base its action on the occurrence of identity theft; instead, the FTC’s allegation seems 
to imply that the allegedly “unreasonable” security program which made the patients’ 
information vulnerable, in and of itself, constituted an unfair practice.296 The FTC 
concluded that LabMD’s “failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to 
prevent unauthorized access to personal information” caused “substantial injury to 
consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition and is 
                                                
294 Complaint, In the Matter of LabMD, Inc. (FTC Aug. 2013) available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter. “Peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file 
sharing applications are often used to share music, videos, pictures, and other materials between persons 
and entities using computers with the same or a compatible P2P application (“P2P network”). P2P 
applications allow a user to both designate files on the user’s computer that are available to others on a P2P 
network and search for and access designated files on other computers on the P2P network. After a 
designated file is shared with another computer, it can be passed along among other P2P network users 
without being downloaded again from the original source. Generally, once shared, a file cannot with 
certainty be removed permanently from a P2P network.” Id. at 4.  
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296 The FTC noted that “a number of the SSNs in the Day Sheets are being, or have been, used by people 
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(emphasis added).  
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not reasonably avoidable by consumers. This practice was, and is, an unfair act or 
practice.”297 
 Because of a separate administrative proceeding against LabMD’s CEO, the 
dispute regarding FTC’s authority to police cyber security standards is currently on hold 
until the separate proceeding comes to an end.298 If the case is reviewed in federal court, 
the court will have to determine whether the FTC has abused its discretion in alleging 
that “unreasonable” security practices cause consumers “substantial injuries” – even 
where no identity theft has occurred.299  
d. Why the FTC Should Frame the Harm as One to Dignity  
 LabMD has challenged the FTC: how are consumers harmed if their PII has not 
been used to commit identity theft? Some, including LabMD, believe the FTC may be 
exceeding the role set for it by Congress.300 The FTC’s authority over deceptive practices 
is clearly defined, but critics charge that Congress never intended for the FTC to regulate 
data security practices it considers to be “unfair.” The FTC should respond that injuries 
occur in the form of a dignitary harm, putting consumers in the unfortunate position of 
doubting the security of their PII. Doing so stays true to the common understandings of 
                                                
297 Id.  
298 See 11th Circuit Allows FTC Data Breach Case Against LabMD to Proceed, NAT. L. REV. (Jan. 22, 
2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/11th-circuit-allows-ftc-data-breach-case-against-labmd-to-
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299 A federal court would review the agency’s interpretation for abuse of discretion. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & 
Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) (holding that courts can review agency unfairness determinations). 
300 See, e.g., David Allen Zetoony, The 10 Year Anniversary of the FTC’s Data Security Program: Has the 
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privacy and dignity, while also positioning itself in a traditional role as protector of 
consumer dignity.  
i. Conceptual Accuracy  
 There is an inherent tendency to assume that the interest protected by the FTC’s 
data-security actions is privacy. Indeed, the FTC itself constantly speaks in terms of 
privacy.301 This is to some degree, no doubt, influenced by the reality that privacy-related 
claims are popular among plaintiffs suing in private actions.302   
 Privacy, however, is not the interest at stake where no identity theft has occurred. 
Individuals’ privacy is arguably invaded when their PII is outside of the control of the 
intended recipient. This is especially true if one defines privacy in terms of control; the 
personal information the individual desired to keep secure is now outside of that person’s 
control. But privacy requires some viewership of the information desired to be kept 
secret.303 Although viewing of the information for use to commit a further crime certainly 
occurs in some breaches, it does not in all. Thus, if harm is defined only in terms of 
privacy, any harm an individual experiences, if the individual (or FTC) cannot prove 
viewership of the PII, would be neglected. In contrast, dignitary harm is not dependent on 
actual viewership of the information or use of the information to commit a further crime. 
The mere knowledge that viewership and use could occur places the individual in a 
                                                
301 See, e.g., Statement of Director Joshua Wright, Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss 
at 7, In the Matter of LabMD, Inc. (FTC Nov. 2013) (noting that “[t]he Commission has been involved in 
addressing online privacy issues for almost as long as there has been an online marketplace.”).  
302 See supra note 244.   
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suspended state of anxiety and fear stemming from the loss of negative freedom 
regarding what the unknown hacker may do with the information. 
 Conceptual clarity is necessary to both affirm common understandings of what 
each of privacy and dignity means, but also to understand how best to remedy invasions 
of each. As Daniel Solove notes, “[u]sing the general term “privacy” can result in the 
conflation of different kinds of problems and can lead to understandings of the meaning 
of “privacy” that distract courts and policymakers from addressing the issues before 
them.”304 Confusing dignity for privacy does both a disservice in that it elides distinctions 
between the two, affecting the way society responds. For that reason alone, the harm 
should be identified as one to dignity.  
ii. The FTC Has Traditionally Protected Dignity 
 At a more practical level, identifying the harm as one to dignity better positions 
the FTC to respond. Critics charge the FTC is engaging in “boundless” power-grabs to 
redefine what constitutes “unfair” acts, stretching its authority into the data security 
context where Congress has heretofore never directed it to go.305 True, the FTC has no 
Congressional authorization to police data security on which it can rely. But the FTC can 
convincingly argue that it is simply engaging in an unremarkable and, in fact, traditional 
FTC power to protect consumer dignity – even if the company has not deceived 
consumers by holding out a security policy it then failed to abide by.   
                                                
304 Solove, supra note 222. See also, Calo, supra note 217, at 1137 (the “overuse” of privacy “risks its 
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 The Bureau of Consumer Protection has historically protected consumers’ 
autonomy and dignity by policing unscrupulous deceptive acts. As noted above, 
deception interferes with individuals’ development of autonomy, because it distorts or 
corrupts the input of information needed to make certain decisions about how to conduct 
ones’ life. The FTC has a history of pursuing actions against companies for deceiving 
consumers into believing their information was secure or would be used only for a 
limited purpose, and then failing to maintain the promised security standards or using the 
information in an unforeseen way.306 In addition, the FTC also has a long history of 
protecting consumer dignity by pursuing deception through the form of false 
advertising.307 And even its unfairness claims have historically focused on the protection 
of consumer dignity, by guarding against deception and the interference with people’s 
decision-making process. Traditional (i.e., non-data security) FTC “unfairness” 
jurisprudence (derived from complaints and consent orders) consisted of four categories: 
“(1) coercive or high-pressure selling; (2) withholding material information; (3) 
unsubstantiated claims; and (4) post-purchase rights and remedies.”308 The first three of 
these fit well within the traditional conception of autonomy as freedom from coercion, 
deception, and manipulation. Each focuses on freedom from undue influence such that a 
                                                
306 See supra note 257.  
307 See The Role of Advertising and Advertising Regulation in the Free Market, FED. TRADE COMM. (Apr. 
1997), available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1997/04/role-advertising-and-advertising-
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consumer can come to his or her own decision as to how to act or which product to 
purchase.  
 The dignitary interest in “unfairness” actions is subtly different than “deceptive” 
ones, to be sure. In the former, deception interferes with individuals’ decision making 
processes – a classic method of interfering with a person’s quality of choice, and hence 
autonomy. In data breaches, in contrast, autonomy is affected through a loss in one’s 
knowledge of their negative freedom – what one can and cannot do. The problem is not 
that information was misleading (deception), it is that the information is withheld, and 
unknown. This places the individual in a vulnerable state, causing anxiety, aggravation, 
and some of the other subjective physical harms discussed by courts and scholars. 
Although the two are different forms of eroding autonomy, they nonetheless reach the 
same end: a person’s autonomy is reduced, resulting in dignitary harm. 
 This recognition – that the FTC can advance consumer autonomy and dignity with 
its “unfairness” authority and not solely “deception” authority acts – may be occurring. In 
2003, FTC director J. Howard Beales noted in a speech on the Commission’s unfairness 
actions that “[t]he primary purpose of the Commission’s modern unfairness authority 
continues to be to protect consumer sovereignty by attacking practices that impede 
consumers’ ability to make informed choices.”309 By speaking in terms of consumers’ 
decision-making abilities, Beales was implicating autonomy and consumers’ dignity 
interests. And in 2008, then-Director David Vladeck noted the FTC’s need to re-
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conceptualize its role in the Information Age, expanding its conception of harm beyond 
being seen as privacy invasions and as tied to the specific loss of money or identity 
theft.310 Vladeck noted how behavioral advertising could cause consumer distress, but 
that the distress was born not from an invasion of one’s privacy, but “an affront to 
dignity”: “there’s a huge dignity interest wrapped up in having somebody looking at your 
financial records when they have no business doing that.”311 The FTC would be well 
served in continuing to vocalize this conception of harm, and in advancing it in its legal 
arguments. Doing so would both direct the focus to the PII recipient instead of the 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 We live in an age where the disclosure of mass amounts of PII is practically 
necessary. Data breaches are, unfortunately, a now common occurrence. To date, 
however, our legal system has largely ignored the harm that individuals – people like 
Mike and Hallie – experience when they receive an e-mail informing them that their 
information is no longer secured. When individuals learn their PII is insecure, they no 
longer operate under the same assumptions they once did, and their knowledge of how 
their PII may be used is kept from them. This loss of negative freedom manifests in 
feelings of anxiety, vulnerability, and distress. This harm is worthy of legal redress, 
because so many individuals must cope with it in our increasingly data-driven world.  
 The Federal Trade Commission is the appropriate vehicle for this redress. The 
FTC acts on behalf of consumers nationwide, and is thus not burdened by showings of 
particularized injury. In addition, Congress gave the Commission authority to redress 
even slight consumer harm if where it is widely felt, which aptly describes data breach 
harm where no identity theft has occurred. But the FTC must do more to assert its 
position in the data security enforcement context. It must frame consumer injury as one to 
dignity. Doing so maintains clear conceptual boundaries, while positioning itself as 
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